

THE ATTITUDE OF SENATOR F. M. SIMONS TOWARD THE  
FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

1902-1926

BY

DORA MAY TREXLER

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BY  
DORA MAY TREXLER

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## PREFACE

Because of his very active career in the United States Senate, and also because of the fact that no other statesman of North Carolina has ever held for such a long time so dominant an influence in the political history of the State, former Senator Furnifold McLendel Simmons has been selected as a study for my thesis.

In his career as a whole, his stand on foreign relations was not so important, but since he lived in a period of such great events in foreign relations, it was necessary for him to take some action with reference to them. Being interested in foreign affairs I naturally wished to find out the attitude of this eminent North Carolinian toward our foreign policies, and just what stand he took.

I have purposely excluded tariff discussions, and the inland waterway project because <sup>it</sup> ~~they~~ seemed to me <sup>a</sup> subject that <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ more domestic than foreign. I have also omitted his two years of service in the House from 1887 to 1889.

D. W. T.





## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

It seems fitting to introduce this subject with a brief sketch of Senator Simmons' life. On January 20, 1854 at the Simmons' Homestead in Jones County, North Carolina, Furnifold McLendel Simmons was born. He received his A. B. degree from Trinity College in 1873 and an L. L. D. degree from the same institution in 1901. After finishing college, he studied law, and during the years between 1874 and 1901 was a practicing lawyer at Raleigh and at New Bern, North Carolina. He was elected ~~as~~ a Democratic Representative to the Fiftieth Congress (March 4, 1887 to March 3, 1889), but was an unsuccessful candidate for re-election in 1888 to the Fifty-first Congress. So he returned to his law office at New Bern and resumed the practice of law.

The year 1892 marked the beginning of a very busy political career for <sup>Mr.</sup> ~~Senator~~ Simmons. At that time he was elected

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1. Biographical Congressional Directory 1774-1911, p. 997.



~~the~~ chairman of the Democratic State executive committee of North Carolina which position he held through 1906.<sup>2</sup> He entered upon his duties during the Fusionist campaign when the Populist and the Republicans were lining up to defeat the Democrats. However, not until the "White Supremacy" campaign did he begin to make himself well known.

In the year of 1898 the mass of white people in North Carolina were determined upon a political change, and it is not a matter of doubt that the war with Spain and the good feeling induced thereby between the sections made possible the political revolution which soon occurred. The Republicans had been in power, <sup>in the State</sup> for quite a while and during their reign ~~they~~ <sup>had</sup> allowed many abuses to creep into the government, of which negro domination was the most objectionable.

The campaign was really begun on November 30, 1897, when the Democratic executive committee met in Raleigh and issued an address to the people in which it said, "We have fallen upon evil days in North Carolina.... Too large a number of its voters are ignorant for the masses to control..."<sup>3</sup>

On May 27, 1898 the Democratic convention met and again elected Senator Simmons as chairman. After a discussion of national matters the State Democratic platform was drawn up. It condemned the Fusion administration ~~and~~ ~~administration~~ for corruption, extravagance, and incompetence,

2. Biographical Congressional Directory 1774-1911, p. 997.

3. Hamilton, History of North Carolina, III, p. 279.





denounced the two Fusion legislatures for saddling negro rule upon the eastern towns and for the choice of negro school officials, and condemned the Republicans and Populists for placing ignorant, irresponsible, and corrupt men in office.<sup>4</sup>

Senator Simmons launched into the campaign with the determination to win, and because of his tireless efforts and outstanding leadership he became known as the "Chieftain." One historian says that the credit for the successful conduct of the campaign was due to Simmons's skillful management.<sup>5</sup>

As time passed, the campaign centered more and more about the negro. Democratic denunciation of the participation of the negroes in politics grew so bitter and the color line was so sharply drawn that finally little else was talked about. When the Republicans and Populists began to accuse the Democrats of an intention to disfranchise the negroes and the other ignorant voters by an amendment to the constitution imposing an educational test, Senator Simmons promptly denied it.<sup>6</sup>

When the time for election day drew near, there was much uneasiness throughout the State for fear a clash would occur between the white and the negroes. However, the election was quiet and the Democrats won with a large majority of both Houses of the legislature and seven of the nine

4. Hamilton, History of North Carolina, III, p. 279.

5. Ibid., p. 282.

6. Ibid., p. 285.



7  
members ~~of~~ Congress.

Soon after the Democrats entered office, they introduced a resolution for a constitutional amendment restricting suffrage, based upon the Louisiana plan of an educational test and the "grandfather clause."<sup>8</sup> This resolution immediately kindled great opposition within the Republican ranks, and the subject was debated back and forth until it was made a campaign issue in 1900. The Republicans declared that it conflicted with the fifteenth amendment because it was directed exclusively against the negroes and would operate only against them. Then they argued that it was unwise and wrong because it would disfranchise all illiterate white men.<sup>9</sup>

In the meantime Senator Simmons as chairman carefully worked out the Democratic plans for the campaign, and made an appeal to the voters by sending out thousands of letters and a vast amount of campaign literature.<sup>10</sup>

So skillfully was the Democratic campaign planned and so cleverly executed that when the election was held on July 24, 1900 the amendment was carried by a large majority.

During the political fight of 1900 Senator Simmons played a dual rôle. While acting as chairman of the State Democratic campaign he at the same time took an active part

7. Hamilton, Op . Cit., p. 293.

8. Ibid, p. 299.

9. Ibid, p. 305.

10. Ibid, p. 310.





in the national campaign by running in the senatorial race against Julian B. Carr. The contest resulted in the election<sup>11</sup> of Senator Simmons by a tremendous majority.

After Senator Simmons was elected, Senators Butler and Pritchard tried to get the Senate, for the first time in its history, to go behind the legislature which had chosen him and decide upon the legality of his election. But they failed in their attempt.

The prohibition question found its origin long before the Civil War in a temperance movement that slowly advanced step by step, through restrictive license laws and judicial constructions unfavorable to the rights of liquor but not until 1903 when Senator Simmons got back of the movement did it really ~~go over~~ <sup>succeed</sup>. This was a subject in which Senator Simmons was vitally interested.

Due primarily to his efforts, the legislature in 1903 put through the Watts Law, which forbade the liquor traffic except in incorporated towns. It also provided for local<sup>12</sup> option laws.

During the campaign of 1904 Senator Simmons, still acting as State chairman, sought to stage a series of joint debates between the opposing candidates but the chairman of the Republican Party ~~sided~~ <sup>sided</sup> the challenge. The only issue that gave the campaign significance was the liquor

11. Hamilton, Op. Cit., p. 314.

12. Connor, North Carolina, I, p. 566.





question. The Republican platform denounced the Watts Law "for its unjust and unfair discrimination in conferring rights and privileges upon the inhabitants of incorporated towns and cities which it denied to the citizens of the country" and definitely placed the responsibility for it upon the Democratic legislature. The Democrats immediately came to the front and so forcefully defended the law that they won in the election by a substantial majority.<sup>13</sup>

The Democratic victory was a great step forward in the progress of prohibition. In 1905 the Ward bill was introduced which provided that no liquor could be manufactured or sold in towns of less than 1,000 population. So much opposition, however, was developed that Senator Simmons as chairman called a meeting of the Democratic executive committee to consider what course should be pursued. The committee declared liquor legislation not a party matter and declined<sup>14</sup> to take any action. The bill, however, passed and became a law.

In the campaign of 1906 Senator Simmons served for the last time as chairman of the State Democratic executive committee. Victory in this election gave to the Democratic Party assurance of a long lease of power and destroyed its<sup>15</sup> unity, for a rift developed within the Democratic Party. Senator Simmons ran for a second time in the senatorial contest

13. Connor, Op. Cit., pp. 525-526.

14. Hamilton, Op. Cit., pp. 338-339.

15. Connor, Op. Cit., p. 529.



and won without any opposition.

The struggle between the two factions of the Democratic Party was carried into the gubernatorial campaign of 1908 in which a three-cornered contest was waged for the Democratic nomination between Loche Craig, William W. Kitchin, and Ashley Horne. Horne soon ~~lost~~ <sup>dropped</sup> out of the race and ~~so~~ the campaign resolved itself into a bitter fight between Craig and Kitchin. By 1908 Simmons representing the conservative wing, got in control of the party organization. So strong had Senator Simmons' power become over this faction that it was called the "Simmons Machine." Kitchin was determined to break the control of the Simmons' machine by running in his campaign for governor as an anti-machine candidate. Craig was given the support of Simmons, ~~also~~ <sup>as well as</sup> that of ex-Governor Aycock and Governor ~~Craig~~. The Kitchin supporters dubbed them ~~as~~ the "Big Four," and in February 1908 published the statement that "certain designing persons had conspired to defeat Kitchin for the nomination." Kitchin himself made the same charge in a speech at Asheboro in which he accused Simmons of being a boss and urged the people to dethrone the boss and follow a safe leader. Later in the campaign Kitchin went so far as to charge that the program of the "Simmons-Aycock-Craig Combination" was to elect Craig Governor in 1908, Simmons Governor in 1912, and Aycock senator in 1912 to succeed Simmons. The three men of course 16 denounced the charges very strongly.







The revolt in the Democratic Party finally resolved itself into a contest between Senator Simmons and Mr. Kitchin. Each hurled criminations and recriminations until the convention was deadlocked for almost a week. However, Kitchin was finally nominated and in the election defeated the Republican candidate J. Elwood Cox by thirty-eight thousand and <sup>17</sup> majority.

During this same year of 1908 a special session was called to decide on State-wide prohibition. The legislature was so strongly flooded with petitions that a bill was passed submitting the question to the voters, for decision at a special election. A campaign followed with the Democrats headed by Senator Simmons advocating the bill and the Republicans opposing it. When the votes were cast it was found that <sup>18</sup> the Prohibitionists had won by a majority of 44,000 votes.

After the gubernatorial election there was a fight over the election of instructed delegates to the Democratic national convention. Senator Simmons was very much opposed to sending delegates that were instructed, so he cast his vote against the resolution but it was adopted by the convention. During this contest someone without consulting him nominated Senator Simmons as one of the delegates at large, and immediately Kitchin launched an attack. He brought up Simmons' record in the Senate, charging that he was out of accord with

17. Hamilton, Op . Cit., p. 341.

18. Ibid, pp. 338-339.



his party and therefore not a suitable man to represent the Democrats of North Carolina at the Democratic convention. Friends of Senator Simmons informed the public that he had not wished to go to the convention as a member of an instructed delegation, nor had he been consulted when nominated. Opposition was then withdrawn and Senator Simmons instead of being damaged by such publicity was elected as a delegate by an almost unanimous vote.<sup>19</sup>

As formerly mentioned Senator Simmons met no opposition in his senatorial campaign ~~until 1906~~ <sup>1906</sup> but he did meet very bitter opposition in 1912, being strenuously opposed by his "mutual enemy," Governor William W. Kitchin.<sup>20</sup> Chief Justice Clark was also an aspirant but was running far behind the other two. Aycock had announced his candidacy but died just before the race began.<sup>21</sup>

Governor Kitchin opened the contest by assailing Senator Simmons' record in the Senate on certain public questions. As soon as Congress adjourned, Senator Simmons then went on the stump and declared that he was very proud of his Senate record and that if he had to do it over again he would follow the same course that he had already taken.<sup>22</sup>

Governor Kitchin, representing the radical wing of the

19. Connor, Op . Cit., p. 532.

20. Ibid., p. 482.

21. Hamilton. Op . Cit., p. 341.

22. Ashe-Weeks-Van Loopen, Biographical History of North Carolina,  
VIII, ~~484~~ 484-485.

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It contains a statement of the President's views on the secession of the Southern States and a declaration of his policy towards them. The President states that he believes the Southern States have no right to secede from the Union and that he will maintain the Union by all lawful means.

2. The second part of the document is a report from the Secretary of the Interior, dated January 1, 1861. It contains a statement of the Secretary's views on the land claims of the Southern States and a declaration of his policy towards them. The Secretary states that he believes the Southern States have no right to claim land in the United States and that he will maintain the land claims of the United States by all lawful means.

3. The third part of the document is a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, dated January 1, 1861. It contains a statement of the Secretary's views on the financial condition of the United States and a declaration of his policy towards them. The Secretary states that he believes the financial condition of the United States is sound and that he will maintain the financial condition of the United States by all lawful means.

4. The fourth part of the document is a report from the Secretary of the War, dated January 1, 1861. It contains a statement of the Secretary's views on the military condition of the United States and a declaration of his policy towards them. The Secretary states that he believes the military condition of the United States is sound and that he will maintain the military condition of the United States by all lawful means.

5. The fifth part of the document is a report from the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 1, 1861. It contains a statement of the Secretary's views on the naval condition of the United States and a declaration of his policy towards them. The Secretary states that he believes the naval condition of the United States is sound and that he will maintain the naval condition of the United States by all lawful means.

6. The sixth part of the document is a report from the Secretary of the State, dated January 1, 1861. It contains a statement of the Secretary's views on the diplomatic condition of the United States and a declaration of his policy towards them. The Secretary states that he believes the diplomatic condition of the United States is sound and that he will maintain the diplomatic condition of the United States by all lawful means.

7. The seventh part of the document is a report from the Secretary of the Education, dated January 1, 1861. It contains a statement of the Secretary's views on the educational condition of the United States and a declaration of his policy towards them. The Secretary states that he believes the educational condition of the United States is sound and that he will maintain the educational condition of the United States by all lawful means.

8. The eighth part of the document is a report from the Secretary of the Agriculture, dated January 1, 1861. It contains a statement of the Secretary's views on the agricultural condition of the United States and a declaration of his policy towards them. The Secretary states that he believes the agricultural condition of the United States is sound and that he will maintain the agricultural condition of the United States by all lawful means.

9. The ninth part of the document is a report from the Secretary of the Commerce, dated January 1, 1861. It contains a statement of the Secretary's views on the commercial condition of the United States and a declaration of his policy towards them. The Secretary states that he believes the commercial condition of the United States is sound and that he will maintain the commercial condition of the United States by all lawful means.

10. The tenth part of the document is a report from the Secretary of the Fisheries, dated January 1, 1861. It contains a statement of the Secretary's views on the fisheries condition of the United States and a declaration of his policy towards them. The Secretary states that he believes the fisheries condition of the United States is sound and that he will maintain the fisheries condition of the United States by all lawful means.



party, thundered against "big business," protective tariffs, and government subsidies of all sorts and appealed for support to the agrarian interests of the State. Senator Simmons, standing for the conservative wing, expressed no hostility to business because it was big, favored such tariff duties and railroad and ship subsidies as would contribute to the industrial and commercial development of the South, and appealed<sup>23</sup> for support especially to those representing such interests.

The campaign finally came to a close with Senator Simmons receiving more than five votes for every one cast for the Chief Justice and nearly two for every one cast for Governor Kitchin.<sup>24</sup> Throughout the State there had been a general feeling that Senator Simmons would win but no one thought he would receive such a crushing majority. This victory entrenched Senator Simmons more firmly than ever in the leadership of the State.

It is interesting to note here that the "Simmons machine" issue which was first started in 1908 by Governor Kitchin was used in every campaign within the Democratic Party from 1908 to 1924 except for 1916. One historian says that the results may be interpreted as "machine victories."<sup>25</sup>

Senator Simmons met no further opposition in his senatorial campaigns until 1930 when he was defeated within his own party.

In tracing the political life of Senator Simmons it is

23. Connor, Op. Cit., p. 536.

24. Ashe- etc., Op. Cit., p. 485.

25. Connor, Op. Cit., p. 549.





necessary to retrogress a little because of the fact that he played a double part in State and national politics. During his first term in the Senate from 1901 through 1908 Senator Simmons took an outstanding part in the controversies over Panama and Cuban Reciprocity. In each instance his position and argument altered the course of his Democratic colleagues.

On the reorganization of the Senate in 1909, he became a member of the Democratic steering committee, and was assigned to the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Commerce. Being in charge of the River and Harbor bills, he was able to perform valuable service for North Carolina by promoting the navigation of its inland waterways. While serving as a member of the Committee on Commerce he was sent on a commission to visit Alaska and Europe in order to make an extensive investigation of waterways.<sup>26</sup>

In 1911 he was made a conferee on the River and Harbor bill, the tariff bills, and the Panama Canal bill. When the Panama Canal bill came before this committee Senator Simmons played a big part in re-writing it. Senator Bristow, also one of the conferees, in speaking of the incident said: "I am much gratified at the part Senator Simmons took in getting in the bill provisions that mean so much to the people of the United States. The North Carolina Senator, who knows how and when to fight; stood with me faithfully, making possible the great victory won."<sup>27</sup>

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26. Ashe- etc., Op . Cit., pp. 481-482.

27. Ibid., p. 483.



As chairman of the Finance Committee, Senator Simmons came to be esteemed as the most powerful of all the Senators. In collaboration with Senator Underwood he drew up the famous Underwood-Simmons tariff bill of 1913, which considerably<sup>28</sup> altered the tariff policy of the United States.

During the World War, President Wilson assigned to him the tremendous task of pressing through the Senate the legislation connected with floating of huge bonds. After the close of the war he took a prominent part in legislation relative to financial and agricultural interests.

In 1930 Senator Simmons was defeated within his own party. His defeat was due primarily to his opposition to Alfred E. Smith in the presidential campaign of 1928. Senator Simmons had opposed Smith because he was a wet. He also felt that if Smith became President the corrupt political bosses of the big northern cities would take charge of the National Government just as they had done in respect to their State governments.

In opposing Smith, he gave his support to Hull, but it was McAdoo whom he wished very much to see in the presidency.

It has been rightly said that no other North Carolinian in the history of the government has filled a larger place in Congress than Senator Simmons and that no other North

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28. Ashe- etc., Op . Cit., p. 483.







Carolinian has ever accomplished more for the benefit of the country and for the honor of the Democratic Party than he.<sup>29</sup>

His personality was so thoroughly interwoven with the great measures that engaged the attention of the Senate from 1901 to 1930 that a history of his work would be a history of the Senate.

Senator Simmons is now living in retirement at his home in New Bern, North Carolina. Although almost eighty, his memory is excellent and his mind lucid and vigorous.

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13. Ashe- etc., Op. Cit., p. 489.



## CHAPTER II

### SIMMONS AND THE DEPENDENCIES

#### THE PHILIPPINES

Furnifold W. Simmons entered (December, 1901) upon his duties as a United States Senator at a significant moment in the history of the United States. The old era of isolation, initiated in a sense by Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe, was giving way to a new period of expansion which was definitely launched by the unanticipated results of the war with Spain.

The most troublesome problem which the Spanish war bequeathed to the United States was that of the Philippines. In the presidential election of 1900, it made an important issue. Were the islands to be permanently retained or were they to be given immediate independence? The Republicans stated that the Filipinos should be given as much self-government as possible but declined to make any promise of ultimate independence, whereas the Democrats demanded an immediate declaration of the purpose of the United States to withdraw<sup>1</sup> from the islands. Since the Republicans won in the election, and continued to control the administration for the next twelve

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1. Mead, The Development of the United States Since 1865, p. 261.





years, complete independence for the Philippines was out of the question. However, they were given a large amount of self-government as promised in the Republican platform.

In furtherance of this promise, a commission with William H. Taft at its head, was sent to the Philippines in 1901 to establish civil government in the islands. Until 1907 this Philippine commission was the sole legislative body.

In the spring of 1902, when the bill to temporarily provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands again came before the Senate, Senator Simmons for the first time expressed his attitude towards the policy of the United States in regard to the Philippine Islands. Being of the Democratic Party he naturally stood for the independence of the Islands. However, not always did he follow his party.

In his speech on civil government for the Philippines he began by comparing our policy towards Cuba with that toward the Philippines. He reviewed the Teller and McEnery resolutions guaranteeing respectively independence to the two islands, and went on to show how the Teller Resolution had been carried out and the McEnery Resolution defeated because of the action of the Republican Party. He then drew up a grand indictment

2. Worcester, The Philippines Past and Present, p. 9.

3. Ibid, p. 768.

4. Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st Session (hereafter cited as 57-1, C. R.), p. 4752.

5. Ibid, 57-1, p. 4753.





against the Republican Party.

"Before these votes there might have been some possible grounds for doubt as to the ultimate purpose of the dominant party in regard to the Philippines. Now, there is no longer room for doubt. The vote of the Republican party upon these amendments is capable of but one interpretation, and that is that it has become the fixed purpose of that party, as far as it can control the matter, to hold these islands for all time as a possession of this country.

"I have no disposition, Mr. President, to discuss the the motives or reasons which have led the dominant party to settle upon one line of policy toward Cuba and a wholly different line of policy toward the Philippines.... there is, in my judgment, no justification for this differentiation, either in morals, public policy, or national obligation; nor yet in the physical or political conditions of these two countries or of their people. At the close of the war with Spain both of these countries were absolutely in our power. We chose to give independence to one; to deny it to the other. Upon what grounds can we defend this discrimination?"<sup>6</sup>

Senator Simmons continues in his speech by comparing the Filipino and the Cuban, showing that there is no material difference.

"It can not be excused or defended upon the ground that the Filipino is less capable, or less prepared, or less ready for self-government than the Cuban.... The native uneducated





Filipino is just as intelligent, just as bright, as the native uneducated Cuban. There is an educated class in both islands, but if there is any difference between them it is very slight and not material. There is also a foreign element in both the islands, but with reference to this foreign element there is this important distinction- that it is in closer touch and sympathy with the native Filipino than it is with the native Cuban.

"Neither can this distinction in treatment be justified upon the ground that we promised independence to the people of one of these countries and did not promise it to the other, or to any difference in aspiration of these people in this regard. Both of these people, when we interfered in their affairs, were similarly situated with reference to Spain. Both of them were in insurrection against her authority; both of them were fighting for independence, and neither of them was considering any terms of surrender or settlement, or reconciliation short of independence. The insurrectionary armies of both these countries joined with our forces in overthrowing the power of Spain, and in both instances with the understanding, either expressed or implied, that if success attended our joint efforts they were to have independence." 7

Further on he stated in no uncertain terms what he thought should be done about the Philippine Islands:

"There are many things involved in the Filipino situation





about which I have had doubt and about which I still have doubts, but there is one proposition in connection with it about which there is not now and never has been any doubt in my mind. That proposition is this: that considering our own interest, present as well as future, this government ought to relinquish possession of these islands and withdraw from the archipelago just as soon as it can do so consistently with honor and our national obligations to those people."

Senator Simmons went on to mention the fact that if the United States decided to retain the islands permanently it would be confronted with a grave question as to ~~how~~ <sup>how they</sup> should be governed. If we governed them as colonies we trampled on the fundamental principles of the Constitution and if we sanctioned such violations there, then we were endangering those same principles here at home. On the other hand, we could not admit the Filipinos, many of them only half civilized and only a part with any understanding of the principles of self-government, as citizens of the Republic without degrading the citizenship of this nation and inviting countless dangers. He admitted that he thought the Filipinos after so long a time would be able with our assistance to establish a government satisfactory to themselves and suitable to their conditions but he also thought that they were "utterly incapable of understanding or applying the



these principles. It has taken ages to develop from the best possible material a people entirely fit for constitutional freedom. Many enlightened nations are still unequal to that condition."<sup>9</sup>

He reminded the Senate of the experience which the United States had already had in trying to train by education an inferior race: ".... For thirty years the negro has been not only a member of a self-governing community, but a participant in that government. During that time millions of dollars have been spent to educate him and to fit him for the duties and responsibilities of American citizenship.

"Those who are most familiar with the result know that he is to-day but little better prepared for an intelligent and responsible discharge of those duties than he was in the beginning. If he has made any improvement or progress in that regard it has been exceedingly slight. The duties of suffrage and of citizenship under our constitutional system seem to be a thing beyond the capacity of his understanding. The defect in his case is not to be overcome, as the experience of the last thirty years shows, by education, or by training,<sup>10</sup> and the reason is obvious. It is a defect of heredity."

In this same speech Senator Simmons brought some terrible accusations against the American army stationed in the

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9. C. R., 57-1, p. 4753.

10. C. R., 57-1, p. 4754.





Philippines. In his criticisms, he said the soldiers were ordered to go into Samar and "murder every person capable of bearing arms, beginning at the age of ten, and going almost to the grave."<sup>11</sup> There were many other charges which he brought against the army but this one seemed ~~to me~~ the most extreme. A ll of the charges may have been well founded but ~~I have my~~ <sup>This appears</sup> doubtful. ~~I think~~ Senator Simmons was sincere in what he said, but ~~I also think~~ <sup>perhaps</sup> he was ~~badly~~ misinformed. ~~For~~ <sup>It</sup> does not seem possible for soldiers from this great country of ours to commit the atrocities which he accused them of. Nor have I been able to find in any of my readings on the Philippines statements to verify his accusations.

In the following passage, he stated why, in his estimation, the United States wished to hold the Philippines:

"The truth is, and everybody knows it, we want these islands for purposes of exploitation, for purposes of commercial advantage. The people have been led to believe if we keep them we can coerce their trade and, by one device or another, force them to buy our goods; that it means 10,000,000 more customers for our mills and factories, and that it opens a gateway to the markets of the Orient. Such is the general impression, and this is largely, if not altogether, the inspiration of whatever sentiment exists in favor of the retention of these islands. It is a matter of trade, of markets for goods. This, I am sure, is the view taken of it in my State, and I believe elsewhere."<sup>12</sup>

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11. C. R., 57-1, p. 4755.

12. C. R., 57-1, p. 4755.



Senator Simmons then went on to prove that the Philippines would not be such a commercial profit to us as many people thought, because huge sums of American capital would have to be ~~first~~ expended there before the islands could be made a paying proposition.

"....Mr. President, every dollar invested in the exploitation and development of the Philippines, every dollar invested in building railroads and factories and cultivating lands there will be a dollar withdrawn from the development of the boundless undeveloped resources at our own doors.

"If the islands become valuable to us for trade, we must make that trade, and we will have to make it by the withdrawal of capital needed here and which can be more profitably employed here in the development of our own resources. More than that, Mr. President, whatever trade we create here by the development of our own mines, forests, fields and factories is practically all our own. While at present we are only getting about 8 per cent of the trade of the Philippines, and under most favourable conditions, if we retain the islands and develop them, in view of the experience of the colonizing nations of Europe, it can be safely said we can not hope to get more than a part of their trade.....The growth of manufacturing at the South....has been retarded by the want of capital. The increase of these 20 years is but a fraction of what will be the increase of the next 20 years if the capital which we expect will find investment there is not unfortunately diverted from us for the purposes of exploitation in distant parts of the world. Certainly no other





part of the world to-day offers more profitable investment than the South. What is true of the South is also relatively true of a large area in the western part of our country.

"If the money which we have spent in the Philippines since the close of the Spanish war had been invested in true reclamation of the arid lands of the West millions of acres of valuable land would to-day be open to settlers, and in the next generation would have yielded a trade more profitable than we can hope to get from the Philippines for generations to come....Mr. President, every consideration should lead us to build up our country and trade here at home before seeking doubtful and hazardous enterprises abroad." 13

I have quoted rather extensively from the speech which Senator Simmons made before the Senate on April 28, 1902 in order to show his attitude at that time towards our Philippine policy. I might give numerous additional passages which were very illuminating, but I shall only add the concluding remarks of his speech:

"Mr. President, when we oppose territorial expansion in the far away islands of the Pacific Ocean, our political adversaries taunt us with the statement that Jefferson, the great founder of the Democratic Party, was an expansionist, and that the Democratic Party itself, in its early history, was a great practical advocate of expansion.....

"The question there was whether, on the one hand, our



country should be limited by the Mississippi River, while the vast interior of America should be controlled by European nations and European interests, and dominated by monarchical institutions, or, on the other hand, whether between the Pacific and Atlantic there should be but one single Union, composed, indeed, of separate States, but equal and sovereign States, owing allegiance to a common flag and entitled to receive and receiving equal rights, protection, and privileges under that flag. The question here is a question of two flags, one emblazoned by a galaxy of stars, representing a Union of equal States and speaking to all the nations of the earth of the surpassing excellence of our institutions, and the other an ensign of imperial sway over 10,000,000 of conquered subjects.

"I protest, Mr. President, against quoting the action of the leaders of the Democratic Party in securing America for Americans as a precedent for the acquisition of the Philippine Archipelago and the subjugation of the Filipinos to our yoke. The expansion of Jefferson was a natural expansion. It brought safety, not danger. The proposition to extend the limits of our country to another hemisphere and to establish under our flag imperial sovereignty across the ocean is an entirely different proposition, and one behind which lurks dangers against which the whole history of Republican institutions, present and past, is a solemn warning."





On July 1, 1902, the bill temporarily providing for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands was passed. This bill provided for the taking of a census after the insurrection should have ceased and general peace should have been certified to by the commission. It also provided that two years after the publication of the census if peace still continued, the commission should call a general election for the choice of delegates to a popular assembly to be known as the Philippine Assembly, and that the legislative powers should be vested in a legislature of two houses, the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly.<sup>15</sup>

Senator Simmons had quite a bit to say on this bill in his speech on the Philippines, and was heartily opposed to it. In no uncertain terms did he make his criticisms.

"Mr. President, I had hoped, . . . , that when the committee on the Philippines reported their bill providing for a civil government for the Philippines they would disclose what the Republican party has up to this time apparently sought to keep concealed, and that they would inform the American people in this bill what was to be the ultimate purpose of the Republican party with reference to the Philippine Islands.

". . . . And yet when their bill comes in- and I am not going to discuss its details- it contains only about six pages with reference to the civil government of the islands, al-

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15. Worcester, Opp. Cit., p. 768.



though it is a bill of a hundred pages and bears the rather proud title of a bill temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands and for other purposes." It would have been better if it had been entitled "A bill for other purposes than the administration of civil government in the Philippine Islands." 16

In 1916 a bill was introduced into the Senate to provide 17 for a more autonomous government for the Philippine Islands. Since 1902 Senator Simmons had remained quiet on the Philippines question. Now that independence for the Philippines was within sight, he again came forward and stated very strongly his opinions on this subject. He was still in favor of Philippine Independence, but was opposed to the idea of turning them loose after so many years of subjection without any protection. In this connection, he said:

"I was going to add to what I have said that I have always believed that as soon as it was wise and just to ourselves and to the Filipinos we ought to retire from the islands and give them an opportunity to govern themselves. I still feel that way about it. I believe when we do retire it would be a wise thing for us to provide for some international system of guaranteeing the sovereignty of those people, because I very much fear unless it be done that as soon as we get out of the way they will be the prey of some

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16. C. R., 57-1, p. 4755.

17. C. R., 64-1, p. 1140







designing powers of the earth."

In conclusion he added:

"....The thought I had in mind, and what I intended to suggest, was that the Filipino people before we went into the islands had been for a long period of time under the control of Spain. Since we have been there they have been under our control, and they will remain under our control until we leave them. When we do leave there they will have no government of their own; they will have to organize and establish one; they will have no army; they will have no navy; and it does seem to me that it would be rather a hard measure for us to take those people who have never had an opportunity to establish a government or provide for defense, and after having held them suddenly to turn them loose so as to be the prey of the nations without any capacity or opportunity to prepare their own defense. That was the only thought that I desired to emphasize."

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As a result of the bill before Congress at this time the Jones Act was passed, which provided for an elected Filipino Senate to replace the appointed commission, extended the suffrage to all male adults who could speak or write a native dialect, and declared the intention of the United States to withdraw from the islands as soon as a stable government should be established.

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18. C. R., 64-1, p. 1146.

19. C. R., 64-1, p. 1557.

20. Forbes, The Philippine Islands, p.256.



Thus matters stood, when the United States entered the Great War. Naturally, the question of Philippine independence was postponed until peace was restored. After the war when the discussion was resumed, Senator Simmons had nothing to say on the subject, probably due to the fact that he was so absorbed in other affairs which were claiming his attention ~~at that time~~, and also due to the fact that the Republicans, being then in control, had declined to act on the suggestions of the Democratic party.

#### HAWAII AND PORTO RICO

Strange as it may seem, Senator Simmons had nothing to say concerning the policy of the United States towards Hawaii and Porto Rico.

In 1904 a bill was introduced into the Senate for payment to Liliuokalani, formerly queen of the kingdom of Hawaii; an amendment was added to the bill so that it read thus: "That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and hereby, <sup>21</sup> authorized and directed to pay to Liliuokalani, formerly queen of the Kingdom of Hawaii, \$ 150, 000." Senator Simmons voted against the bill. Just why he was opposed to it, I do not know, but it could have been because of the fact that it





was a Republican measure, and <sup>that</sup> he being on the Finance Committee, was in a good position to oppose it.

On February 17, 1917, the Senate, in the Committee of the Whole House, resumed the consideration of the bill to provide a civil government for Porto Rico and for other affairs. During the debates Senator Simmons had nothing to say, nor did he commit himself when the votes were taken. Evidently he was not opposed to the bill but for some reason could not vote for it.

### CUBA

Cuba, like the Philippines, came to us as a result of the Spanish American War, but not in the same fashion, nor is it a dependency in the same sense as the other dependencies. Cuba is nominally a republic under the protection of the United States. America's policy in Cuba is one to which citizens of this country often point with pride.

One of the first problems that ~~had~~ confronted the administration at the close of the Spanish American war was the determination of the relations between the United States and Cuba. At the very beginning, the United States announced to the world that it disclaimed "any disposition or intention



to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof."<sup>23</sup>

The Cubans secured their independence in 1898 from Spain by a revolution in which the intervention of the United States was a turning point. It took three years for the island to recover from the disastrous effects of a civil war, during which time American army officers administered the public services,<sup>24</sup>

When the military government began its work, it was instructed to prepare the people of Cuba for self-government, bring about conditions which would make the founding of a republic possible, and establish institutions in such a sound manner as to insure a successful maintenance of Cuban rule.<sup>25</sup> At the end of three years the work was completed and on May 20, 1902 the government of the island was turned over to its people. Since then, the country has been administered in the name of the Republic of Cuba.<sup>26</sup> It is true that a Platt amendment was incorporated in the Cuban Constitution by the United States, thus placing some restrictions on the island, but it did not entirely violate the promise made by the United States to Cuba.<sup>27</sup>

Senator Simmons had no criticisms to make concerning the political relations which the United States had with the

23. Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, p. 5.

24. Ibid, p. 4.

25. Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, p. 99.

26. Jenks, Op . Cit., p. 5.

27. Latane, American Foreign Policy, pp. 512-513.





Cuban republic, but he did have something to say in regard to our economic relations. However, it was not so much a criticism as a statement of his position of the subject.

The chief Cuban crops are sugar and tobacco, and a large part of both crops was exported to the United States. The Dingley tariff rates had seriously affected the importation of these commodities to the United States, and President Roosevelt with the support of Root and Wood urged that these rates be reduced in order to promote the economic rehabilitation of the island. But when the President brought this matter to the attention of Congress, the domestic beet sugar interests, as well as the sugar cane planters, insisted that a reduction of the tariff rates would ruin their business.<sup>28</sup>

On December 18, 1901, Senator Simmons was placed on the Standing Committee on Relations with Cuba,<sup>29</sup> just in time for the beginning of the reciprocity fight.

President Roosevelt put forth a strenuous campaign in order to get a bill through Congress, but he soon found that all of his efforts had been in vain. In the meantime, while waiting on Congress, President Roosevelt negotiated a reciprocity treaty with Cuba on December 11, 1902, under which Cuban products were to be admitted to the United

28. Howland, American Foreign Relations, (1929), pp. 54-56.

29. C. R., 57-1, pp. 388-389.



States at a reduction of twenty per cent as compared to the  
<sup>30</sup>  
 general tariff duties.

When the Senate failed to act on this treaty before March 4, 1903, President Roosevelt convened an extra session of the Senate which ratified the treaty with amendments but with the unusual provision that it should not go into effect until approved by Congress. Since the House was not in session the treaty had to go over until fall. The President convened Congress in an extra session on November 9, 1903, and in a special message urged that prompt action should be taken on the treaty. On November 19, 1903, the House passed the bill approving the treaty, but the Senate, although it had ratified the treaty, allowed the extra session to expire without passing the bill which was to give the treaty effect. The new session began on December 7, and the Cuban bill was made the special order in the Senate until December 16. The final vote was then taken and the bill passed. With the passage of this reciprocity treaty commercial relations with Cuba were soon established on a firm  
<sup>31</sup>  
 basis.

In his remarks before the Senate, on December 15, 1903, Senator Simmons defined his position on the subject of Cuban reciprocity, and explained the reasons for his actions,

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30. Howland, Op . Cit., pp. 55-56.

31. Latane, Op . Cit., pp. 514-515.





which seemed inconsistent, due to the fact he had acted differently on the question of the Philippines. In explanation he said:

"When the Philippine revenue bill was under discussion in this body during the last Congress, I submitted some remarks in which I attempted to show that those islands were not only extensive in area but that they were exceedingly rich and productive; that if we retained them as a permanent possession of this government American capital and enterprise would inevitably go there and develop, clear, and bring under cultivation those rich lands; that development and cultivation would not be accomplished through and by the employment of native labor, because it was too lazy and shiftless, nor yet by white labor because the white man can not successfully labor in that climate, but that development and cultivation would be accomplished through the employment of Chinese labor; and to that end means would be found to suspend or repeal the anti-Chinese legislation applicable then and now to those islands.

"I then pointed out that by reason of soil and climate those islands were specially adapted to the growth of sugar, rice, tobacco, and, perhaps, cotton, all of which are staple products in this country, and especially in the southern portion of the country. And I argued that in this way, through the policy of the government and the employment of American capital, the agriculture of this country would be brought into competition with the richer soil of the Tropics, tilled





and cultivated by the cheapest labor in the world.

"I was then making an argument against the retention of the Philippine Islands, and in that connection I expressed the opinion that if the agricultural interest of those islands was ever developed so as to become seriously competitive with us it would be through the employment of American capital, and only in the event we should retain them; that it would never be done by native enterprise; for should we retire from the islands we would certainly guarantee their independence and thereby prevent them from falling into other hands.

"Mr. President, I mention that matter in this connection because it may seem that the position which I then took is somewhat inconsistent with the position I shall take upon the measure now before the Senate, and there probably would be some inconsistency but for the fact that the situation with reference to Cuba is very different from the situation with reference to the Philippine Islands. The soil of Cuba is indeed rich, even richer than that of the Philippines, and it is likewise adapted to the growth of some of the staple crops of this country.

"But there, Mr. President, the analogy between the two cases. The agricultural interest of the Philippines is in a crude and primitive condition; that of Cuba is already in a tolerable state of development. If the agricultural interest of the Philippines is ever developed, it will have to be by the employment of outside capital; but, whether we





annex Cuba or not, whether this legislation becomes effective or not, the agricultural interests of Cuba are going to be developed, either by American or European capital or by native enterprise. I think there can be nothing more certain than that.

"....Whether the agricultural interest of Cuba shall be developed by American or European capital or by native enterprise it will not be developed through the employment of Chinese labor. Cuba is not now using, never has, and, in my judgment, never will use Chinese labor.....I have simply said this, Mr. President, by way of explanation of my position upon these two subjects, bearing some relationship the one to the other."

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Senator Simmons then proceeded to say that he had voted for the treaty and was going to vote for the bill for several reasons, but not from any idea that Cuba was in need of charity from the United States, nor from the idea that this government was under any obligation to Cuba. He gave his reasons thus:

"I shall vote for it in part because I think it will be a great advantage to Cuba and we ought to be glad to help her if we can without injury to ourselves, because she is our neighbor and we are responsible for her national existence. I am going to vote for it in part because I believe it will be a means for the establishment of a desirable and permanent



trade relationship between Cuba and this country.... But, Mr. President, my chief reason for voting for this measure is not that it will help Cuba, although I have no objection to doing that,....but because, in my judgment, this legislation will be of great benefit to the people of the United States considered as a whole.

"The opponents of this measure tell us that this concession to Cuba will be a bounty pure and simple. I do not want to stickle about words or terms. I do not know whether or not it can be correctly and properly described as a bounty, but I do know that if it be a bounty to Cuba we will get from Cuba a bounty in return.

"The difference in the two bounties will be against us in the beginning, but Mr. President, if Cuba shall fulfill the just expectation of her friends and of intelligent men throughout the world during the next 5 years, I am inclined to think by the end of that time the balance of bounty will not only be in our favor but that it will be sufficiently in our favor to overcome any difference against us in the beginning."<sup>33</sup>

Senator Simmon's frankness, in stating his real reasons for voting as he did, is to be admired. As we see, he plainly admitted that it was not primarily from any altruistic motive that he voted for Cuban reciprocity, but that it was for the advancement of the interest of the United States. The







Republicans supported this bill for the same reasons that Senator Simmons did but they claimed that they did it out of sympathy for Cuba's distress.

After the reciprocity subject was settled, Senator Simmons remained silent for a long time on Cuban affairs. It was not until 1925 when the Isle of Pines treaty came before the Senate for ratification that he showed any further interest. It seems that this little strip of land had been a "bone of contention" between the United States and Cuba for a long time.

At the end of the war with Spain, Porto Rico and other islands that had been under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies were ceded to the United States. The question to determine was whether the Isle of Pines should be regarded as included in that group of islands or whether it belonged to Cuba.<sup>34</sup>

On July 16, 1903, Cuba and the United States signed a treaty in which the United States gave up the sovereignty over the Isle of Pines to Cuba. This treaty was not ratified within the time that it was supposed to be so a new treaty was signed on March 2, 1904 without any limitations as to the date of ratification. The Senate did not ratify it and ~~by~~ <sup>taken</sup> a vote in 1908 rejected it. Efforts were made by the various Presidents time and again to revive it, and in 1925

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34. Chapman, On . Cit., pp. 157- 158.



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it came before the Senate again.

On March 12 of that year Senator Simmons had quite a few remarks to make concerning this treaty. He was very much in favor of ratification. In this speech he said:

"....In 1897, more than a year before the war against Spain terminated, the Cuban people, in insurrection, just like the American people met in convention, duly and formally called, with delegates elected from and representing all the Provinces of Cuba, uncluding the Province of Habana, delegates from the Province of Habana being voted for by the people of that part of the province of Habana termed the 'Isle of Pines' as well as by the people of that part of Habana Province lying in the island of Cuba, and adopted a regular constitution declaring that the Republic of Cuba was free and of right entitled to be an independent nation. ...The first article of that constitution undertook to declare, and did declare, the territorial limits of the new government of the Republic of Cuba, and that declaration included the Isle of Pines.

"At that time the revolution had been in progress for more than two years. More than 50,000 Cuban soldiers were under arms. The Isle of Pines contributed a part of that army. The constitution went into effect providing for the civil government of the new Republic of Cuba. That constitution was filed with the Department of State of this







Government, and it was upon the request of the representatives of the new government of the Republic of Cuba that the United States intervened in the war between Cuba and Spain. So that Cuba was a government- an orderly, regularly, and legally organized government- ,at the time we intervened, and we intervened at the request of the Government.

"....According to my theory of this matter, whether the Isle of Pines was geographically and integrally part of the island of Cuba or not, the Isle of Pines had a right to associate itself in the rebellion with Cuba, and it did associate itself in that rebellion with Cuba. It furnished its just and fair quota of soldiers in the struggle. It joined itself with Cuba in the formation of this new government and became politically a part of the Republic of Cuba, and when we entered the war we recognized that Government and declared that it was free and of right ought to be free and independent.....So that to my mind it makes but little difference, in the consideration of this problem, whether the Isle of Pines was geographically a part of Cuba or not; she became politically a part of Cuba, as she had a right to do, and after the adoption of a constitution, in which she participated, she became a part of the Cuban Government."

The treaty was ratified on March 13, 1925.<sup>37</sup> One writer

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36. C. R., 69-1, pp. 181-182.

37. C. R., 69-1, pp.159, 205-206.



remarked that "though this act of justice toward Cuba was reprehensibly long delayed, it must be said that the Isle of Pines, all along, had been administered as a part of Cuba."

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38. Chapman, Opp. Cit., p. 159.





### CHAPTER III

#### DIPLONOMY AND THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

##### PANAMA

The first question of Latin American affairs to confront Senator Turnifold Visions was one of wide international significance- the spectacular recognition of Panama and the exploitation of Colombia. To understand this controversy which arose in the United States Senate in 1904, it is necessary to go back to 1901 when the United States began taking definite steps in realizing a long cherished dream, that of a water route through the narrow neck of land connecting North America and South America.

The first step which the United States Government took was to clear away diplomatic obstacles to the construction of the Canal. A part of this was successfully effected by abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer treaty made with Great Britain in 1850 which provided for the construction of the canal under their joint supervision. The Hay-Pauncefote

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1. Martin, History of the United States, p. 183.



treaty of 1901 gave the United States authority to proceed alone, on condition that there should be no discrimination<sup>2</sup> against other nations in the matter of rates and charges.

This accomplished, it was now necessary to decide where the canal should be built, of the two routes offered, one through Nicaragua and the other cutting a channel through<sup>3</sup> Panama, preference was finally given to the Panama project.

The next problem and the most important one was that of securing from Colombia a right of way for the canal. And here is where the United States ran into a snag which furnished this country with a controversy that extended over many years.

Early in 1903 a treaty was signed between representatives of the United States and those of Colombia. This (Hay-Herran) treaty provided that Colombia was to make the grants, and to receive in return ten million dollars and after nine years an annual rental of two hundred and fifty thousand<sup>4</sup> dollars.

The treaty, however, was not ratified by the Colombian Senate. Immediately a strong tide of public opinion was developed in Panama against the action of the Colombian Congress. Representatives from Panama visited the United States,

2. Howland, American Foreign Relations, 1929, p. 202.

3. Ibid, p. 202.

4. Haskin, The Panama Canal, p. 233.





and secretly secured from President Roosevelt assurance that the United States would not be opposed to Panama staging a revolt. On November 3, 1903, Panama declared her independence. When Colombian troops attempted to land in Panama, American marines prevented them, and three days later the United States recognized the independence of Panama.<sup>5</sup>

Such hasty action on the part of the United States caused much criticism not only in Colombia but also here in the United States.

Senator Simmons played an important part in the affairs of the United States with Panama. On this subject he was intensely interested. In 1914 his position and his arguments unexpectedly altered the course of his Democratic colleagues during the toll controversy. On January 27, 1904, in a speech before the Senate, he made an earnest plea for the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty. There were many in the Senate who felt that they could not vote for the treaty because they did not approve of the revolution that had been conducted in Panama. To this argument Senator Simmons explained that "the revolution <sup>and</sup> ~~is~~ the recognition of Panama as an independent State are two separate and distinct propositions. And I think to refuse to ratify the treaty because we can not approve of the way in which Panama acquired her independence, would be to unnecessarily confuse

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5. Arias, The Panama Canal, pp. 65-67.



these two separate propositions."

He stated that he condemned, just as much as his colleagues, any wrong that the President and the Administration might have done in connection with bringing about the independence of Panama, but that he also recognized the fact that Panama was now an independent State with as much right and power to make a treaty as we ourselves possessed. It was just a matter of recognizing an accomplished fact and making the best of it.

"Mr. President, to my mind, you might as well say that I can not administer on the estate of a dead man without approving of his death as to say that I can not act upon the admitted fact that Panama is an independent nation without approving of the means by which that independence was achieved."

He went on to say that the Panam<sup>~</sup>aians, in his estimation, were really justified in revolting against the despotic rule of Colombia, and that Panama was just following the course which this country took in declaring its independence from England.

"Mr. President, I can not find it in my heart to blame the Panam<sup>~</sup>aians for seceding from Colombia. If oppression, if tyranny, if despotism ever justified revolutions, they were justified in revolution. They were bound to a State which had never felt or shown any interest in them or in

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their welfare. They were forced to pay ruinous taxes with only nominal representation, without receiving in return any of the benefits of taxation in government or administration, in public improvements or in the education of the people.

"The canal was their only hope for relief from the miserable and wretched conditions to which Colombia's greed and tyranny had reduced them, and even that the government at Bogotá denied them.

"Perhaps their aspirations for freedom were wrong, but our forefathers under like conditions did not think so. Perhaps they should have submitted supinely to oppression but our forefathers under similar conditions struck for liberty and with the help of France achieved it."<sup>7</sup>

Senator Simmons admitted that he could not enthuse over the alleged wrongs of Colombia, because the treaty we made with her was of her own seeking, signed by her authorized agents who had full knowledge of its contents. It provided for the construction upon her own territory of the greatest work of internal and international development ever tried by man but that: "by duplicity and treachery she defeated that treaty, not because she did not want the canal, and would not have gladly taken it upon the terms provided therein, but because she wanted in an indirect way to extort more money from us or the Panama Canal Company, or perhaps from both."<sup>8</sup>

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7. C. R., 58-2, p. 1246.

8. C. R., 58-2, p. 1246.



He said that Colombia's policy toward Panama and toward us in the canal matter illustrated both her traditional policy toward Panama and her standard of diplomacy. He then went so far as to say that in all of Colombia's history he knew of nothing; to excite the admiration of any humane man or any patriotic liberty-loving American citizen, and that when Colombia lost the canal and Panama the principles of right and righteousness had once more prevailed.

He stated that while the construction of the canal was a matter of the greatest importance to all of our people, it was of supreme importance to the section from which he came and that the people of his State felt deeply concerned not only in having the canal but in securing it as speedily as possible.

"....They are impatient of delays; they want to see negotiations ended and the work begun. They preferred the Nicaraguan route, but they do not think that the defeat of this treaty makes the canal at Nicaragua, either in the near or remote future, at all certain.

"They see in its defeat only vexatious delays, dangerous procrastinations, and perhaps the ultimate defeat of their hopes. They do not wish to see this great enterprise become the football of partisan politics. They wish me to vote for this treaty if I can do so without violating





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my conscience...."

In conclusion Senator Simmons said that while he had no sympathy with Colombia, he felt that she had suffered wrong at the hands of the United States and that he hoped our Government would in some way compensate her for those wrongs, and that most of all he hoped the outcome of the whole matter would be the speedy construction of the canal upon terms satisfactory to us, to Panama and reasonably so to Colombia.

On February 18, 1904, Senator Simmons made another speech on our relations with Colombia in regard to the Panama Canal. It was very much along the same line as the message he delivered in January. He stated ~~that~~ he had little doubt <sup>that</sup> ~~but that~~ the revolution in Panama followed as a result of the defeat ~~by~~ <sup>by</sup> the Colombian Congress of the Panama Treaty, and that whether the revolution would have succeeded without our interference he did not know. He said, however, that he rejoiced over the fact that this country was no longer under treaty obligations to Colombia to support her in maintaining a rule of despotism over the poor Panamanian People.

He admitted the fact that in his former speech on that subject he had criticized the Administration for interfering before it had recognized the independence of Panama and that he had also criticized the recognition of the

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independence of Panama by the President as hasty and in disregard of international law and precedent; but that when the President in the exercise of his right under the Constitution recognized the independence of Panama and the other great nations of the world joined in that recognition, he realized the fact that whether rightfully or wrongfully accomplished Panama was an independent nation and must be dealt with as such.<sup>12</sup>

The Senator then proceeded to explain wherein Colombia had been wronged by the United States. He said that our duty had been to defend and protect Colombia's sovereignty over the Isthmus and not to aid any party to take it from her. He also said, that until the minute of recognition, our duty was to maintain the sovereignty of Colombia, but that after the recognition our duty was transferred from Colombia to Panama. He, this time, laid the blame on the ex-Secretary of War and not on the President of the United States.

He explained that under the Constitution and the practice of this Government, the recognition of belligerency or independence of a foreign government was an Executive function vested in the President as the Chief Executive of the Nation, and that when in the exercise of that function, he recognized the belligerency or independence of a foreign nation, whether the recognition be rightful or wrongful, it

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12. C. R., 58-2, p. 2248.





was binding upon all of the departments of the government and upon the people. He further stated that there was only one question before the Senate at this time:

"....and that is whether this is a meritorious treaty--a treaty which the Senate, in the interest of the country and of the discharge of its duties to the world, ought to ratify. The other questions, the question of right and wrong in connection with the revolution and the recognition of the independence of Panama, are separate and distinct questions and should be dealt with separately and distinctly.

"....Whether action is taken before the ratification of the treaty or afterwards, I have an abiding faith that sooner or later action will be taken, and that in some way these wrongs will be measurably righted. But if anything is to be accomplished in this direction, it will have to be accomplished not by the defeat of this treaty, not by confusing the question of its ratification with questions growing out of the revolution and recognition but by separate action and by treating each as a distinct proposition."<sup>13</sup>

On December 4, 1905, Senator Simmons introduced a resolution ~~for an~~ <sup>of</sup> inquiry ~~to be made~~ relative to the names and salaries of the employees of the Panama Canal Commission.<sup>14</sup> The resolution, however, was not brought up for discussion until January 12, 1906. In regard to this subject, Senator

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13. C.R., 58-2, pp. 2249-2250.

14. C.R., 59-1, p. 845.

the first of these is the fact that the system is not self-sufficient. It is dependent on the outside world for many of its needs.

The second of these is the fact that the system is not self-sufficient. It is dependent on the outside world for many of its needs.

The third of these is the fact that the system is not self-sufficient. It is dependent on the outside world for many of its needs.

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The fifteenth of these is the fact that the system is not self-sufficient. It is dependent on the outside world for many of its needs.

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Simmons had quite a few remarks to make. It seems that there was an impression in this country that something was radically wrong with the administration of affairs upon the Isthmus. He was of the opinion that the charges brought against the Panama Commission were not true but since the President had asked for an investigation his request should be complied with.

His concluding remarks are of special interest ~~to me~~ in that they reveal the fact that Senator Simmons was a politician who could put principles above party ~~lines~~. And throughout his political career, as we shall see, he usually managed to put the interest of the people first.

"So far as I am concerned, I hope that nothing has transpired on the Isthmus up to this time to bring discredit upon the enterprise in which we are engaged. I hope that nothing has occurred there to bring reproach upon this Government; and I want to say right now if the present administration, or any other future administration charged with the duty of building this canal shall do well down there, or shall do even fairly well down there, so far as I am concerned as a member of the Inter-Oceanic Canal Committee, as a member of this Senate, and as a citizen, I shall, without regard to party or party advantage, uphold that Administration though it may be one to which I do not belong and with which upon general lines I have no sympathy."

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15. C. R., 59-1, pp. 892-894.

16. C. R., 59-1, p. 894.





On August 6, 1912, the Senate sitting as a Committee of the Whole House resumed the consideration of the bill to provide for the opening, maintenance, protection ~~and~~ operation of the Panama Canal, and the sanitation and government of the Canal Zone.

Senator Simmons opened his address on this subject by reviewing the various plans which had so far been submitted. He then launched into what he thought were the three problems of government<sup>al</sup> business on the Canal zone. He stated that the first problem would be the supervision and control of the canal proper after the canal was completed, and the second problem would be the inauguration of civil government for the people who lived on the narrow strip of land on each side of the canal belonging to the Government of the United States. The third problem, which he gave, was the continuation of the work of sanitation which had<sup>17</sup> been started by Colonel Gorgas.

He went on to say that his chief objection to the House plan of a one man government in the Canal zone was the fact that such a responsible position would be placed in the hands of a civil engineer.

"I am perfectly willing, Mr. President, to vest what you might call the chief power in the hands of one man, but with three great departments of momentous interest to the government, some of business, some affecting the life and



liberty in the citizen, some affecting the health of the citizen, I want each one to have a fit representative in its control.

"....I am opposed to the House proposition to turn over all these great interests to one man and that man an engineer of the army."<sup>18</sup>

Senator Simmons also stated that he did not favor the Senate committee plan because it would be ~~too~~ expensive. The committee plan was to reduce the membership of the commission to three members, one chosen from the corps of engineers of the army, who was to be president of the commission. According to Senator Simmons, these men would have to be of a very high type, so would naturally demand big salaries.<sup>19</sup>

He then discussed the toll question. One of the Senators from Massachusetts had said that he believed the other maritime nations would pay the toll of their ships through the canal. Because this, Senator Simmons remarked, would put American shipping at a great disadvantage if our ships had to pay toll. Further on he made a statement which several years later put him in a most embarrassing position.

"Shall we solve that question of doubt in the interest of American commerce to relieve it of this discrimination or shall we solve it against American commerce and impose this discrimination?"

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18. C. R., 62-2, p. 10287.

19. C. R., 62-2, p. 10290.





"....I want to solve it by letting these vessels go through free, and if that makes a case for the Hague tribunal I can not help it, so far as my vote is concerned."<sup>20</sup>

In the course of the discussion, amendments were offered for this Panama Canal Bill. Senator Simmons proposed that railroad-controlled ships or vessels should not be allowed to engage in foreign commerce through the canal. Upon hearing that Senator Smith from Georgia made a motion which met his objection to the bill; Simmons withdrew his amendment.<sup>21</sup>

On August 9, 1912,<sup>discussion of</sup> the bill to provide for the opening, maintenance, protection, and operation of the Panama Canal and the sanitation and government of the Canal zone was ~~again~~ resumed ~~for discussion~~ with the Senate sitting as a Committee of the Whole House. This time Senator Simmons directed his entire attention to the subject of railroad-owned vessels passing through the canal. He objected strenuously to the railroads attempting to monopolize the water as well as rail transportation. In fact he made a violent attack upon the railroads. He said that the problem which confronted our Government was that of protecting the people against the control by railroads of competing water lines, with a view to preventing a monopoly in transportation and to provide a workable and effective method of regulating freight rates. He stated that there were two ways in which we could secure

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20. C. R., 62-2, p. 10302.

21. C. R., 62-2, p. 10457.



to the people the benefits of this canal. One was to make it a free canal for American ships and the other was to ex-  
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 clude from it all vessels owned by competing rail lines. He declared that the railroads were behind this demand for tolls. In conclusion he said:

"....With tolls retained, and railroad-owned vessels allowed, the Treasury of the United States would take in a few dollars, but the people would have to pay on the great commerce that crosses the continent five times as much in higher rates to the railroads. The Government would save a few dollars and the people who make up the Government and supply it with all its funds would loose many dollars.

"....Whether tolls are charged or not, the people will get but little benefit from the canal in the way of reduced transportation rates, in the way of regulation of freight rates, unless by excluding railroad-owned ships we prevent the railroads from practically taking charge of the great waterway and, by driving out all others, prevent it from being in competition with them- thus utterly defeating one of the main purposes if, indeed, not the chief purpose, of  
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 its construction."

In August the various amendments which had been passed were engrosed, and the bill put to a vote. Senator Simmons voted in favor of it. The bill was passed with an amendment forbidding any railroad to be directly or indirect-

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22. C. R., 62-2, p. 10574.

23. C.R., 62-2,p. 10576.





ly interested in any ship passing through the canal carrying freight in competition with that railroad. There was also an amendment giving free passage not only to coastwise shipping, but also to any American ship engaged in foreign trade if it could be used in time of war by the United States

<sup>24</sup> Government. According to the general procedure, a Conference Committee was held, and it eliminated the exemption ~~of~~ ships engaged in foreign trade, but maintained it for the <sup>25</sup> coastwise trade.

Immediately after the toll bill was passed, Great Britain protested against the exemption on the ground that it was a clear violation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty which required that the canal should be opened to all nations "on terms of entire equality." In reply to this protest the United States stated that as only American vessels could engage in the coastwise trade there was no discrimination against the vessels of other nations. Great Britain, however, after laying down her objections to the toll exemption law, requested that the matter be submitted to the Hague Tribunal for settlement. The American Government refused this course so the matter was left standing until President Wilson came to the ad-  
<sup>26</sup> ministration.

On June 1, 1914 the Senate, sitting as a Committee of the Whole House, resumed the consideration of the bill to amend section 5 of the act to provide for the opening, main-

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24. C. R., 62-2, pp. 10295, 10396, 10443, 10447, 10584, 11065.

25. Bunau-Varilla, Panama: Creation, Destruction & Res., p. 511.

26. Haskin, Op. Cit., pp. 299-305



tenance, protection and operation of the Panama Canal and the sanitation of the Canal zone, which had been passed in 1912.<sup>27</sup>

Senator Simmons on this same day got himself into a very tight place. Unintentionally he caused this discussion, which would have otherwise been very dull, to be rather dramatic. Immediately after the subject was open for discussion he launched into a most eloquent plea for the repeal of the tolls law. Surely he must have forgotten ~~quite a~~ <sup>the ex-</sup> ~~few~~ <sup>tensive</sup> remarks which he had made two years before when urging exemption, or he would not have committed himself so deeply. He began thus:

"Does anyone believe that our neighbors to the north and to the south will view with complacency the discriminatory conditions following the opening of the canal which I have described? Does anyone doubt that this discrimination, not only against their commerce but against their vessels, will arouse antagonism? Does anyone doubt it will not only prejudicially affect our present friendly relations with them but will tend to defeat one of the main objects we had in view in the construction of this canal, namely, to further cement our political relations and to extend our trade and commerce with the countries of this hemisphere?

"In view of the consequences certain to result from these discriminatory rates, is it not apparent, even if we





were under no treaty guaranty of equality, if we were absolutely free and untrammelled to do what we pleased with respect to charges and conditions of traffic through the canal, that a sound and wise public policy, in the interest of peace and amity and of commerce, would dictate that we should not for a small and to say the least, doubtful, advantage deliberately pursue a course which will inevitably lead to such disastrous consequences to our political and trade relations with our neighbors and friends upon this continent, to say nothing about similar though less acute complications in our commercial and political relations with the other nations of the world?"<sup>28</sup>

He then went on to say that in all these years, the first suggestion, that we have any selfish motive in this matter of giving our ships preferential treatment was made by the "dollar diplomacy" administration of 1912. He failed to mention the fact that he had been one of the strongest advocates for exemption. He said that the \$10,000,000 which we paid for this strip of land and its appurtenances was a mere bagatelle compared with its actual value, and that the payment of this money was not the real consideration for this extraordinary territorial and political concession but that "....The real consideration was the assurance and promise ungrudgingly given by us and implicitly relied upon by Panama that we would construct a canal through the



center of this strip sufficient to accomodate the largest seagoing vessels and maintain and operate it in perpetuity, on terms of entire equality to the interoceanic commerce of the world, thus bringing this great world traffic through the eastern and western gateway and past the very doors of the little infant Republic." <sup>29</sup>

He also stated that if we should repudiate our guarantees to Great Britain and Panama ~~that~~ the whole world would confront us with a sentiment of chagrin, distrust, disapproval and resentment. <sup>30</sup>

As soon as Senator Simmons had concluded his speech, Senator Borah began his attack, and here is where the discussion began to get lively. Senator Borah brought up a speech made by Senator Simmons on August 6, 1912, and quoted that part in which Senator Simmons had said that if there was a doubt as to whether we had the right, a reasonable and substantial doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the American people and American interests. "Now two years later," said Senator Borah, "Simmons thinks that the doubt should be resolved against us." Senator Borah then quoted again from Senator Simmons' speech made two years previously:

"We have built that canal at a cost of \$ 400,000,000, a sum that staggers the imagination- the greatest engineering feat of all the ages. It is the property of the people."

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29. C. R., 63-2, p. 9719.

30. C. R., 63-2, p. 9719.





The question is, Shall we so safeguard and protect that property as to make it an instrument in the accomplishment of the will and purpose of the people in its construction or shall we, by indifference and carelessness, fail to do that and permit the men who fought it, the men who for so many years delayed it, to get control of it and measurably defeat one of the main purpose of its construction? Shall we do that? I hope not.

"If we want to secure to the people the full measure of benefit which they have a right to expect from the construction of this great enterprise, there are two ways in which we can do it. One is to make it a free canal for American ships. The other is to exclude from it all vessels owned by competing rail lines."<sup>31</sup>

Senator Simmons, although he was taken unawares by Senator Borah's attack, came back with a strong defense.

"Mr. President, I did say two years ago, and I have said probably many times in my life, because it is a well-established principle of legal construction and of human action, if there is a doubt <sup>of</sup> your right to do an act which you regard as being in your interest, you have a right to resolve that doubt in your own behalf. That is not only a rule of construction but it is a rule of human action. And, Mr. President, when the canal act was passed, not only myself but a great many other Senators and members of the House of



Representatives, who have since changed their position on the tolls question entertained very grave doubts about what were our rights with respect to this question under the Hay-pauncefote treaty, and we did feel we might resolve those doubts in behalf of the United States." <sup>32</sup>

He proceeded to explain that since 1912 much light had been shed on the subject, and that a most thorough investigation had been made before the Interoceanic Canals Committee (of which he was a member). He said that he had attended these hearings of the committee regularly for three weeks, and as a result of the light of the testimony that was presented to the committee, he had come to the conclusion that the United States had not the right to exempt its coast-wise trade from the payment of tolls while exacting tolls from the vessels of other nations. He concluded with the following statements:

"I want to say that in 1912 the committee gave comparatively little consideration to this question.... I did entertain doubts about what was the proper course of action at that time. When that matter came before the conference committee, of which I was a member, I was still in a state of doubt about tolls exemption, but that was not the only question before the conference; there was another matter connected with this conference. That matter was the question of separating railroads from water transportation." <sup>33</sup>

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32. C. R., 63-2, p. 9731.

33. C. R., 63-2, p. 9731.





The Senate on June 11 began the final disposition of the Tolls Repeal bill and adopted an amendment offered by Senator Simmons which reserved any rights the United States may have under the Hay-Pauncefote to exempt American ships from tolls.<sup>34</sup> On June 15, 1914 the act repealing the exemption of the act of 1912 was finally passed.

Thus closed a stormy period in the Senate which had its beginning in the making of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty back in 1901. As to the tolls question we first see Senator Simmons pleading in favor of exemptions for our ships. Two years later he had completely switched over his course of argument and plead just as eloquently for the repeal of those exemptions. He not only justifies his actions but wins the whole Democratic rank to his point of view.

It is interesting to note here that in 1921 when the Harding administration resumed the question of again granting free tolls for American ships through the Panama Canal, Senator Simmons voted against it.<sup>35</sup>

### MEXICO

Concerning affairs in Mexico, Senator Simmons had very

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34. C. R., 63-2, pp. 9993, 10008, 10081, 10247.

35. C. R., 67-1, p. 6169.



little to say. At the time when our relations with this country were in such a critical state, Senator Simmons was intensely occupied with the launching of war measures, and after the war, he devoted his attention mostly to taxes, tariffs, and the various peace movements. This accounts in part for his silence on a subject that from 1913 through 1920 threatened to be a very serious affair.

On November 19, 1910, the Diaz government urged the United States to send troops to guard its frontier because of a revolutionary movement spreading throughout Mexico. However, it was not until March, 1911 that any extra troops were sent to the international border.<sup>36</sup>

On August 1912 Senator Simmons made one remark in regard to the situation in Mexico and this was merely in the form of a question. It seems that one of the Senators from Georgia had expressed the idea that since our government had sent marines to Nicaragua to protect property rights there, it would now follow the same policy in regard to Mexico. To this remark Senator Simmons replied:

"I should like to ask the Senator from Georgia if in the conclusion which he reached in the earlier part of his remarks, that because the government had sent marines to Nicaragua for the purpose of protecting certain property rights there was therefore a probability that troops would be sent to Mexico for the purpose of protecting personal rights

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36. Ripoy, The United States and Mexico, pp. 332-333.





which have been invaded here, rights affecting life and liberty, the Senator has not overlooked the fact that this is a day of dollar diplomacy."<sup>37</sup>

The Wilson administration adhered to a general policy of "watchful waiting" but the affair of 1914 was one occasion in which the system broke down. On April 20, the President asked Congress for authority to use the armed forces of the United States in demanding redress for the arrest of American marines at Tampico. Some American sailors had been arrested by a Mexican officer. The Mexican government, although it immediately released the men, refused to make the required apology for the incident. As a result American forces were landed at Vera Cruz, and the city was seized. A clash of arms followed in which several Americans and many more Mexicans were killed. After a few weeks of negotiation, during which Huerta, the usurper, was forced out of power, American forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz, and the incident closed.<sup>38</sup>

On April 21, the Senate, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, passed a bill justifying the employment by the President of the armed forces of the United States in enforcing the demands against Huerta. Senator Simmons took no part in the discussion, but when the votes were cast ~~he~~<sup>39</sup> voted in favor of the bill.

37. C. R., 62-2, pp. 11514, 11517.

38. Latane, Op . Cit., pp. 672, 673.

39. Ripoy, Op . Cit., pp. 355-358.; C. R., 63-2, pp. 6885, 7014



In 1916 a second break occurred. In the spring of that year, a band of Villa's men raided the town of Columbus, New Mexico, killing several citizens and committing robberies. Immediately President Wilson sent a punitive expedition under Pershing in pursuit of the bandit. When the Carranzistas at Carrizal during the third week of June killed and captured ~~a member~~<sup>one</sup> of Pershing's soldiers, President Wilson demanded the release of the soldiers. For a moment Carranza, the new head of the Mexican government, refused. The entire militia of the United States was ordered to the border and available men for Governor-Generalship of Mexico were discussed. However, the men were released and war thus averted.<sup>40</sup>

On March 13 of that year Senator Simmons made some remarks before the Senate on the Mexican situation, especially in regard to the reinforcement of the punitive expedition which had been sent into Mexico. There were those in this country who were impatient with the slowness of the American Government in taking action against Mexico. Many telegrams were sent to the Military Department urging that large forces be sent to aid the expedition. In Congress there was a rumor that the Government was not in a condition to meet the situation. Senator Simmons felt that the Government was fully able to take care of the Mexican affair without having to enlarge our regular army and he was very much opposed to the Government taking any hasty action. As to our preparedness, he said:

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40. Rippey, Op. Cit., pp. 355-358.







"I believe that at present we are sufficiently prepared to do the work that we have immediately in hand and can quickly get ready for any ulterior eventualities.

"I do not undertake to say, and nobody in this country would say, if we become engaged in a regular war with Mexico, we shall not have to enlarge our army as well as call out the National Guard. What I mean to say is that at this time by the use of the National Guard, supplementing our Regular Army, we shall be able to meet the situation down there. I do not wish that the impression shall go either to Mexico or the people of the United States that we are in such a weak and impotent condition of unpreparedness in this present emergency as may be implied by the remarks of some Senators here upon the floor to-day."

"....I believe that everything ought to be done that can be done in order to put ourselves in a state of adequate preparedness; but, Mr. President, it is very well known that you can not hastily prepare legislation dealing with great questions of this sort, with the many perplexing problems that arise in connection with them. It takes time for that."<sup>41</sup>

#### Nicaragua

Senator Simmons did not seem very interested or con-

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41. C. R., 64-1, pp. 4005-4007.



cerned about affairs in Nicaragua. His remarks concerning the relations of the United States with this country are rather meager. However, he did have a little to say about Nicaraguan conditions in 1928 and also the proposed Nicaraguan Canal.

The close relations of the United States and Nicaragua because of this potential canal through the latter's territory have given the United States more anxiety over her domestic and international relationships than over those of the other Central American republics. The Nicaraguan government has been so weak and the country such a stamping ground for revolutions that it has been necessary for the United States to intervene in its affairs more often and for longer periods than elsewhere. Especially has this been true since 1912, when internal troubles became so great that American marines<sup>42</sup> were landed at the capital and not recalled until 1925. Soon after the marines had left, revolutionary movements reappeared. So the following year a large contingent of marines were again sent to the capital with a special mission<sup>43</sup> headed by Henry L. Stimson. Mr. Stimson succeeded in persuading the rival leaders to cease hostilities and to abide by the results of an election that was to be held in 1928 under American supervision. Before the election occurred, however, the United States was forced to send additional

42. Latane, Op. Cit., p. 552.

43. Buell, International Relations, p. 487.





troops to put down the guerilla warfare that was being carried on by General Sandino who had refused to accept the Stimson <sup>44</sup> agreement.

In regard to the Sandino affair Senator Simmons admitted before the Senate on April 23 of that year that he had not made a study of the subject but was forced to depend largely upon the public press and the speeches made in the Senate for his information. However, he made some assumptions.

"I have assumed that Sandino, at present at least, and probably in the beginning, was engaged in a revolution in an attempt to overthrow the Diaz government. I have assumed also that in the beginning of the struggle, probably in the disorder that was occasioned, harm or injury might have been inflicted upon Americans either with respect to their property or their lives.

"But I have assumed, since I did assume that to be the case- and that is why I asked the question of the Senator a few moments ago- that if that had happened in the first stages of this revolutionary movement, then when the United States interceded for the purpose of protecting American property, Sandino had sufficient sagacity to know that this Government was able to protect its property and its citizens, and that he dared not to continue to trespass upon the rights of American citizens.

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44. Buell, International Relations, p. 487.



"The question that I asked was whether at the present time there is any evidence that Sandino, in carrying on his revolutionary operations against the Diaz government, is interfering with the rights of American property or jeopardizing the lives of American citizens?"<sup>45</sup>

On May 25 of that same year, Senator Simmons had a few remarks to make in regard to the Nicaraguan Canal.

"....When I first came to the Senate, in 1900, Senator Morgan was constantly delivering some of the greatest speeches I ever heard upon the Nicaraguan route for a canal. He seemed to have become so interested and wedded to that project that he lost sight of everything else that was before the Senate, and almost every week he would come in with something to say about that route, and it was always illuminating. I think he had thoroughly convinced the Senate that that was the only feasible route at that time; but just before there was a vote Senator Hanna, who had recently come to the Senate, made one day a very strong plea for a change of the plan upon which the Senate seemed to have agreed up to that time from the Nicaragua route to the Panama route. There was suddenly a very great change in the attitude of the Senate, and Senator Morgan was beaten.

"I do not know anything about the present controversy; but at that time I was rather convinced that the Nicaragua route was the better of the two. If the Government can

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45. C. R., 70-1, p. 6972.





afford to spend the money, I do not know but that it would be very well to have two canals- one by way of Nicaragua and the present canal at Panama. I must confess, however, that I have not given the question very serious consideration. It has been a long time since we acted upon it; but it occurs to me that there may be possibly good reasons why we should have another canal."

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46. C. R., 70-1, p. 9686.



## CHAPTER IV

### SIMMONS AND CANADIAN RECIPROCITY- SUPPORT OF MERCHANT MARINE

#### CANADIAN RECIPROCITY

In 1911 President Taft caused much opposition in the ranks of the western Republicans by advocating a reciprocal agreement with Canada. This compact was to provide for free trade between the two countries in a number of food products and for mutual reduction of duties on manufactured products. The manufacturers of the East were, of course, very much in favor of it, because it would give them the advantage of reduced Canadian tariffs on their exports to Canada without the *necessity of meeting* ~~having to meet~~ any great competition from Canadian manufacturers, but the farmers of the West saw only ruin for them since the free admission of Canadian wheat and other food products would depress agricultural prices here. The bill was finally pushed through Congress by President Taft with the aid of Democratic votes but such to his <sup>1</sup>humiliation it was turned down by the Canadian Parliament.

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1. Mead, Op. Cit., p. 313.





Senator Simmons, however, was one of the Democrats who fought this bill most strenuously. One of the most outstanding speeches he made on foreign relations was that against Canadian Reciprocity. In fact he made the leading speech of the opposition. On March 2, 1911 he launched his attack:

"I am opposed to this reciprocal compact because both in theory and practice reciprocity is not only un-Democratic, but distinctively Republican; because this particular agreement is unequal in the concessions made by the two countries, unjust in the discrimination it makes between raw materials and unfinished products, and especially because it is oppressive to the farmer, whose products it puts upon the free list while the things he buys for the support of his family and the operation of his farm are still highly protected.

"I am opposed to it because, while pressing down the price of farm products, it will not reduce the price of the cost of living to the consumer; because its entire burdens will fall upon the farmer, the fisherman, and the lumberman, while the benefits that may accrue from it will inure to the great newspaper and periodical publishers, along with three great trusts, all of whom are now selling their products to their Canadian customers cheaper than they sell them to the American consumer."



Senator Simmons then proceeded to point out the un-Democratic features of this agreement. He stated that the importations into the United States from Canada covered by this agreement for the year 1910 amounted to about \$ 47,000,000. Of those importations forty million dollars represented the products of the farm, the soil, the forest and the fisherman, and they were to be placed on the free list thus causing a loss of \$ 4,335,000 of revenue to the United States Treasury. The other seven million dollars worth of importations covered by this agreement were made up of manufactured products, the duties upon which were at present prohibitive, and under the agreement would remain protective. So that as a result of this agreement, of the \$ 47,000,000 of imports covered by the agreement which came into this country during the year 1910, forty million would be placed on the free list and seven million on the protective list; or in other words, the agreement provided for about six sevenths free trade and about one seventh protection. Therefore it was either free trade or protection, and as to these two policies Senator Simmons said:

"Mr. President, I am opposed to free trade and I am opposed to protection. Both, in my judgment, are bad, and a mixture of the two is worse than either, because of its discriminating inequalities. The Democratic Party is not a free-trade party; it has never been a free-trade party; and I do not believe it will ever become a free-trade party; why, then, should Democrats be asked or expected to vote for a bill which, while chock full of free trade and protection,





ignores the Democratic principle of tariff for revenue, or, if there be any recognition of that principle, only negligibly<sup>3</sup>"

He further added that he opposed this agreement because it put the things the farmer made upon the free list, but required him to pay heavy tariff taxes upon the tools, implements and machinery used in making them, and that this applied even to the articles manufactured out of his own products. In fact, it was an agreement which gave the farmer nothing, but required him to pay the price of practically all the benefits it sought to secure for others. He concluded with the following remarks:

"I indict this treaty upon the ground of its discriminations, its inequities, its favoritism. I indict it as a measure in the interest not of the American consumer, but of the American trusts. I charge that its benefits will go, in the main, to a few special interests, such as the great metropolitan newspapers and periodicals, the Harvester Trust, the Automobile Trust and the Coal Trust and that the price will have to be paid by a class of our people whose profits in<sup>4</sup> their occupation are far less than those legally subsidized."

### THE MERCHANT MARINE

The Merchant Marine was a subject in which Senator

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3. C. R., 61-3, p. 3894.

4. C. R., 61-3, p. 3896.



Simmons was keenly interested. The Congressional Record from 1906 through 1920 contain many speeches which he made on the floor of the Senate in behalf of the Merchant Marine.

Since the Civil War the United States has done very little to promote its shipping interests. It is true that legislation has been broached in Congress several times in the past twenty years in behalf of our sea-going vessels but such subsidies as were offered were not sufficient to induce new ventures in the transatlantic service or to maintain contract vessels on the longer routes to South America, Australia and the Orient.

Four-fifths of the freight and three-fourths of the first cabin passenger traffic originates in the United States, but the major part of the shipping employed belongs to Great Britain, Germany, France and Japan. As a result, large sums of money are paid every year to foreign companies by Americans<sup>5</sup> in freights and fares as well as for mail service.

From 1906 through 1910 Senator Simmons continually urged that the ocean mail ships be subsidized. In one of his speeches he explained that it was not because he necessarily favored ocean mail subsidies but because it was a means<sup>6</sup> toward an end. He said that the ships should be paid so much per mile according to tonnage, as an inducement for better

5. Coman, The Industrial History of the United States, p. 332.

6. C. R., 61-3, pp. 1813-1816.





intercourse with those undeveloped countries, where the United States could find opportunities, for further development.<sup>7</sup> He stated that the question confronting America was no longer supplying home consumption but to find foreign markets for that which we could not consume. In the same speech he said:

"We have not by any means reached the limit of our industrial growth. We have only fairly begun. With equal and adequate sea transportation, we may hopefully look for our growth in the world trade during the next quarter of a century to become as striking as ~~has~~<sup>8</sup> been the growth of our home trade during the last quarter."

In 1914 when war began to rage in Europe, an unusually large demand for carrier ships arose. The steamer market was steady, with the demand greater than the supply. As a result, people saw their cotton piled high at the gins, the lumber unmoved and food products congested because there were not enough ships. Freight rates for ocean tonnage jumped to an exorbitant price. Soon our ships were being blown up by floating mines and submarines as though they were not neutral.<sup>9</sup>

In referring to this situation Senator Simmons said:

"Mr. President, as a result of the events of the last<sup>2</sup>

7. C. R., 60-1, p. 3257.

8. C. R., 60-1, p. 3258.

9. Spears, The Story of the Merchant Marine, pp. 9-12.



years, we have gained a new and broader viewpoint and a clearer vision and perception with respect to ourselves and our relations to the other nations of the world, and we see now clearly where we before saw only obscurely; and this clearer vision has brought within our horoscope dangers we had not before seen, of our pitiable unreadiness to meet and combat those dangers.

"....In the past we have safely relied upon our greatness in population, in wealth, and in natural resources as our sure bulwark against outside attack. We have felt in the past that we were so powerful and so rich that no nation dare attack us. We have relied upon this; but we have relied possibly more upon our geographical isolation as a sure protection against outside attack....

"We have learned that the seas which separate us by thousands of miles from Europe and Asia do not now, as formerly, afford security against aggression, invasion, or attack. We now see clearly that modern discoveries, inventions, and science have overcome the difficulties which made them in former times a safe barrier of protection....The broad expanse of water which separates us is no longer an ob-  
struction."<sup>10</sup>

After the United States was drawn into the war, our Government was forced to purchase and build a large fleet of merchant ships to facilitate the transport of troops and goods





to Europe. With the close of the war the Shipping Board attempted to keep these ships in operation, but the decline in the demand for shipping facilities made maintenance unprofitable. The Government was "up a tree" as to what to do with all of these ships; so it began selling them to individuals. 11 Senator Simmons felt that they should be used by the government in establishing a permanent merchant marine. He said:

"I am thoroughly convinced that if we are to have, within our day and generation, an adequate merchant marine, we will have, through the instrumentality of the government, to establish that merchant marine right now....My theory is that the Government of the United States is in a capital position just at this time to complete this merchant marine. It is a magnificent position to complete this great merchant marine, to build and commission enough cargo ships and enough passenger ships to make a well-balanced, well-rounded merchant marine, worthy of the greatest nation upon the earth.

"The purpose I have in making this argument is that if these ships are sold in the way they are now being sold by the board to private individuals, then the great plants which the Government has built, which cost millions of dollars, are going to lie flunked, shipbuilding in this country is going to come to an end, many of the ships that have already been built will go under a foreign flag, and at the end we will find that with all the expenditure of money and all the talk



about the establishment of an American merchant marine our merchant marine will have disappeared and we shall have none."<sup>12</sup>

Senator Simmons contended that the United States should go ahead and build up the merchant marine, and then make the decision as to whether it should be operated by the Government or placed in the hands of American subjects with certain restrictions.

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12. C. R., 66-2, p. 2833.





## CHAPTER V

### SIMMONS AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

#### IMMIGRATION

Since the passing of the western frontier, immigration has been a problem in this country but not until the beginning of the twentieth century did our Government come to realize that the tremendous influx of alien immigrants was a matter worthy of serious consideration. During the first hundred years of our national history such attention as Congress gave to the question was in the direction of encouraging immigration rather than of restricting it.

By 1882 the <sup>last</sup> high-water mark in immigration was reached with 789,000 foreigners coming into this country. From 1900<sup>1</sup> to 1914 nearly a million more immigrants came in each year. With the out break of the Great War in 1914 the first check was given, but as soon as the war was over the tide again

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1. Garis, Immigration Restriction, p. 2.



took an upward turn. Not without reason did our political leaders as well as the country at large become alarmed.

Senator Simmons was greatly concerned over the immigration problem. Realizing that the hordes of foreigners being admitted into this country were a menace to our social and economic order, he became a most insistent advocate for restriction.

In 1907 he made a speech before the Senate on the subject of immigration. Many of his remarks were confined to the Japanese and Chinese problem in California. He pointed out that due to the lack of assimilation of the Japanese and Chinese on the west coast, the West was now presented with a problem similar to the one that the South had had with the negro. He went on to say that he thought the people of the West could best handle this problem because they knew what character of legislation was needed. Since the South demanded the right to localize the negro problem, the West should be granted the same privilege in regard to the care of its<sup>2</sup> foreign element.

Senator Simmons' remarks in regard to California were prompted by the fact that she had just been harshly criticized by President Roosevelt for passing some laws of a highly discriminatory nature against the Japanese.<sup>3</sup> The San Francisco

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2. C. R., 59-2, pp. 3080-3081.

3. Caris, Immigration Restriction, p. 314.

The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the origin of life. It is shown that the problem is not only a scientific one, but also a philosophical one. The scientific aspect of the problem is concerned with the question of how life arose from non-life. The philosophical aspect is concerned with the question of whether life is a necessary part of the universe or whether it is a mere accident.

The second part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the various theories of the origin of life. These theories are divided into two main groups: the theory of spontaneous generation and the theory of biogenesis. The theory of spontaneous generation is the older of the two and is based on the idea that life can arise from non-life. The theory of biogenesis is the newer of the two and is based on the idea that life can only arise from pre-existing life. The paper discusses the evidence for and against each of these theories and shows that the theory of biogenesis is the more plausible of the two.

The third part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the various experiments that have been conducted to test the theory of spontaneous generation. These experiments have shown that life cannot arise from non-life under the conditions of the earth. This result is in agreement with the theory of biogenesis. The paper also discusses the various experiments that have been conducted to test the theory of the origin of life from inorganic materials. These experiments have shown that life can arise from inorganic materials under certain conditions.



School Ordinance requiring all Japanese children to attend the Oriental school in Chinatown had been so insulting to the Japanese that the Japanese Government protested such a law.<sup>4</sup>

On March 18, 1912 when the Senate, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill to regulate the immigration of aliens, Senator Simmons offered the following amendment:

"All persons over 16 years of age and physically capable of reading who can not read the English language or some other language; but an admissable immigrant or person now in or hereafter admitted to this country may bring in or send for his wife, his children under 18 years of age, and his parents or grandparents over 50 years of age, if they are otherwise admissable, whether they are so able to read or not.

"That for the purpose of testing the ability of the immigrant to read, the inspection officer shall be furnished with copies of the Constitution of the United States, printed on uniform pasteboard slips, each containing no less than 20 nor more than 25 words of said Constitution printed in the various languages of the immigrant in double small pica type. Each immigrant may designate the language in which he prefers the test shall be made, and shall be required to read the words printed on a slip in such language. No two immigrants listed on the same manifest shall be tested with the same

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4. Harris, Immigration Restriction, p. 349.



slip. An immigrant failing to read as above provided shall not be admitted, but shall be returned to the country from which he came at the expense of the steamship or railroad company which brought him: Provided, That all persons, whether able to read the English language or some other language or not able to do so; who shall enter the United States except at the seaports thereof, or at such other place or places as the Secretary of Commerce and Labor may from time to time designate, shall be adjudged to have entered the country unlawfully, and shall be deported as by law provided." <sup>5</sup>

This amendment was nothing more than the literacy test which had been advocated time and again in Congress only to be defeated. Not until 1917 did it finally become law over the Presidents' veto. <sup>6</sup>

After presenting the amendment, Senator Simmons entered into a discussion of some of the important aspects of the immigration question, but confined himself mostly to the amendment. He stated that every year the various States spent millions of dollars to educate their boys and girls for good citizenship and then in the face of all this expenditure the country let the doors down and admitted each year between two and three hundred thousand of as "densely ignorant and illiterate peoples as live under God's SUN." <sup>7</sup>

5. C. R., 62-2, p. 3531.

6. Howland, American Foreign Relations, 1929, p. 439.

7. C. R., 62-2, p. 3535.





He explained that he had no sectional or race prejudice in the matter and that he had nothing to say of the peoples of other nations except good, but that the part which he would exclude were not representative of the people of the countries from which they came.<sup>8</sup>

In conclusion he said:

"....I do not want to be understood in advocating an illiteracy test for the exclusion of immigrants as meaning that an unlettered man is necessarily and always an ignorant man in the sense of his not being intelligently informed in matters of general knowledge and that he is not under certain conditions a good citizen.

"It is this element who come here unfitted for citizenship who, after they get here, segregate themselves in the slums of the great cities or in colonies of our manufacturing and mining centers, who learn nothing by contact and make assimilation practically impossible, who are willing to live on less and work for less than the native American or old class of immigrants, who are unsettling the labor conditions of the country and making an advance in the conditions of unskilled labor as compared with that of skilled labor impossible, I would exclude."<sup>9</sup>

On January 20, 1913 when the Senate was considering a bill proposed to regulate the immigration of aliens to and the residence of aliens in the United States, Senator Sim-

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8. C. R., 62-2, p. 3538.

9. C. R., 62-2, p. 3543.



mons, during the discussion, expressed quite a bit of concern over the increasing number of criminals being admitted into this country. He said:

"The great difficulty, Mr. President, in administering the provision of our laws against the admission of criminal aliens is in ascertaining the facts bearing upon the record of the immigrant. If we can secure some official evidence under the laws of the country from which he proposes to emigrate showing that he is or is not entitled to admission, I think it would be a matter of wise precaution to take advantage of that law...."<sup>10</sup>

As soon as the war was over a huge tide of immigrants began to pour into the United States, and by 1921 the volume of immigration was back to almost three-quarters of what it was before the war. At this time it was reported from the American consular officers in Europe that millions were waiting for transportation facilities to carry them to the United States.<sup>11</sup> These reports created such deep concern in this country that there arose an insistent demand that Congress take steps to put a drastic limitation upon immigration. In response to this demand, a bill was introduced into Congress<sup>12</sup> at the beginning of 1921 temporarily to suspend immigration. In regard to this measure Senator Simmons said:

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10. C. R., 62-3, p. 1777.

11. Mead, The Development of the United States Since 1865, p. 417.

12. C. R., 66-3, p. 340.





"Mr. President, ever since I have been in the Senate I have been deeply interested in this question of immigration. Shortly after I came to the Senate, as the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Lodge), who has just risen from his seat knows, when we were considering an immigration bill I offered an amendment to that bill imposing the educational test. That amendment was adopted by the Senate, but was stricken out in the conference. Subsequently, however, it was incorporated in the immigration laws of the country. That was shortly after this new immigration, so called, began very greatly to exceed the old type of immigration, when we began to feel that there was a real menace to the country from the influx of immigrants that were then pouring into this country in increasing numbers from southern and eastern Europe....

"I do not believe that in the condition we have now there is any ground for apprehension that during the next 6 or 8 or probably 12 months we are going to have any very great volume of immigration from Europe; and I say that in the face of the fact that during the first six months after the armistice the volume of immigration was nearly as great as it was before the war. This six months was a period of very great business activity in this country; but during the past few months, since the slowing down of industrial activities, this immigration has been to a great extent checked....

"As long as this period of depression through which we are going continues I entertain no serious apprehension of excessive immigration from Europe, especially from southern



and eastern Europe. I am confirmed in this conclusion by the fact that the Italian Government, recognizing our situation and the public sentiment in this country against additional immigration at this time from that country, has issued a decree suspending further emigration from Italy to this country." <sup>13</sup>

Senator Simmons went on to say that while the South generally objected to a heavy immigration from southern Europe, his section of the State was very anxious to get good farmers and that it did not matter whether they came from one section of Europe or another so long as they were well trained and came here with the purpose of settling down.

He explained that the problem which presented itself was not one which could be solved by excluding indiscriminately the desirable immigrants as well as the undesirable. In his judgment the circumstances did not call for that kind of legislation but that they did call for a very rigid policy of selection which would keep out the undesirable class and at the same time admit the class which this country needed to supplement the requirements of the American farmer. In conclusion he suggested:

"....that there is at present no real or very serious danger of any great influx of undesirable aliens during the next few months, for the reasons...., namely, the deterring





economic conditions of this country and the action of the Italian Government in suspending immigration. Most of these undesirables are from Italy. Why, then, the necessity of forcing action upon this, as I think, ill-considered legislation, legislation that does not adjust itself to the real situation, that does not remedy the real evil, and fails to open the gate to the extent of admitting those whom we need at this time in order to supplement inadequate labor upon our farms." <sup>14</sup>

The bill under discussion did not, however, pass in its original form but was re-written so that it provided for a definite numerical restriction of immigrants coming to the United States. In May 1921 it became a law and by this law the number of aliens admitted to this country in any one year from any European, Asiatic or African country was limited to not more than 3 per cent of the number of people of that country residing in the United States according to the census of 1910. <sup>15</sup>

On April 17, 1924 Senator Simmons, in an address before the Senate, expressed very fully his attitude toward the whole immigration policy of the United States and in his remarks showed wherein immigration had an important bearing on the agricultural situation of the South. He said:

"I concede that there is hardly any question of greater

14. C. R., 66-3, p. 3455

15. Mead, The Development of the United States Since 1865, p. 417.



importance to the American people at this time than the question of a proper control of immigration. I recognize that the conditions of to-day more than at any time in our history call for drastic restrictive legislation upon the subject. Personally I have always been in favor of restrictive legislation. I have never thought at any time that we ought to throw our doors wide open to immigration from the Old World. I have supported every measure that has been introduced looking to the restriction of immigration, because I thought the rights of the American who has built the nation and made it what it is ought to be carefully guarded.

"....I am not only in favor of restrictive immigration, I am not only in favor of the restriction that we have heretofore imposed, but I am in favor of further radical restriction. I voted for the 3 per cent limitation in the present law. I shall vote for the 2 per cent limitation now proposed by the committee to the pending bill.

"I am in favor of selective immigration, but I want the selection based upon something else and in addition to the requirement that the immigrant shall be able to read and write in some language, that the immigrant is an able-bodied man, that he is not a criminal, and is a man of good character. Those are very necessary restrictions; they ought to be applied in the process of selection; but I want the selective principle carried further than the present law would carry it. I want it based upon something in addition to the test of admissibility. I want it to go to the point of the kind and character





of immigration we need and want to come to this country. A selective principle which disregards the economic needs and the economic wants and requirements of the present situation will be wholly inadequate to accomplish the purpose that I desire should be accomplished through the principle of selective immigration."

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After thus stating his stand, Senator Simmons launched into the very heart of his message and dealt with the agricultural situation of the South. This was a subject very dear to Senator Simmons. Being from an agricultural section, he naturally understood the needs of the farmers. At this time the farmers were confronted with a loss of their labor supply which was proving to be very serious. There were two reasons for this; first, the invasion of the boll weevil which had made cotton farming unprofitable, and secondly, the inducements which the industries in the North and West offered to the negro to migrate. In respect to this situation he said:

"....Something, therefore, must be done to relieve the situation. Some effective, adequate remedy must be found unless more than 40 per cent of the population of this country who produce that from which we derive our wealth and our prosperity are to be overwhelmed with ruin and bankruptcy. No



more serious situation has ever confronted a country."<sup>17</sup>

He stated that the only solution for the problem would be diversification in agriculture and intensive cultivation, both of which called for a type of labor experienced in the art.

"If we are to diversify, we must have men who know something about diversified farming. Diversification of agriculture does not consist only in diversifying the plant crops. Under that term is properly included horticulture....Now the question and the only question to my mind is, can we get the<sup>18</sup> kind of people we desire?"

Senator Simmons explained that the immigration laws should be changed so as to give the farmer preference over other types of aliens. In this way the agricultural interests would not only be supplied with the proper type of labor but the whole country would be benefited by the introduction of skilled laborers. In conclusion he explained:

"Mr. President, my proposition is simply to give the farmer a preference. I propose to give him a preference of 50 per cent because he is the man who deserves a high per cent....

"We have some skilled farm laborers in this country, it is true; but in the sections that are now distressed they are not in sufficient numbers, and we can<sup>not</sup> get them from anywhere else inside the United States in sufficient numbers....

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17. C. R., 68-1, p. 6523.

18. C. R., 68-1, p. 6524.





"The reason why the farmer is entitled to so large a preference as compared with the industrial enterprises grows out of the fact that the industries under present conditions are supplying their shortage at the expense of the farmer. The farmer is not supplying his shortage at the expense of the factory."<sup>19</sup>

Senator Simmons' suggestion, however, was not accepted by Congress. Instead, the Johnson bill, known as the "Immigration Act of 1924," was passed. It provided for the admission, annually, of two per cent of the number of each nationality in the United States, based on the census of 1890. It also provided that no one should be admitted who could not be naturalized under our laws.<sup>20</sup>

As we have already noted Senator Simmons took a rather active part in the discussions on immigration prior to 1924 but after that date he had nothing more to say on the subject. This was due primarily to the fact that from then on he was very much absorbed in financial legislation. Then, too, no outstanding changes have since been made in the immigration laws.

#### THE WORLD WAR

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19. C. R., 68-1, pp. 6526.

20. Garis, Immigration Restriction, p. 171.



Senator Simmons stood with President Wilson in all of his efforts to avert war with Germany but when he saw that war was inevitable he felt that we should enter the fight and enter it with a determination to win. To him was assigned the task of putting across the most stupendous appropriation ever made. In presenting to the Senate the measure for the first huge bond issue, he declared:

"....The time for action has arrived. The decree has been entered solemnly after long hesitation and much deliberation. After reflection, study, discussion on the floor of Congress and in all the vehicles of publicity throughout the country, the people have decided to take the step which has been taken.

"....The time for counting the cost and the consequences is past. We must press forward. We must get solidly behind the administration. Our pledges of support must be backed by action.

"Since we have entered upon this thing, let us put aside all doubts and avoid the dangers of procrastination. Let us do whatever is necessary for our own preparedness to help our allies across the water to more effectually fight their battles and our battles."  
21

He stated that the general purposes and objects of this great bond issue were understood and approved by practically all the people of this country, and that there was not any





necessity for delay in its passage. He added:

"Mr. President, I had hoped, and I still hope, that before this day ends, before the Senate again adjourns, we shall pass this bill. I do not know anything that we can do at this time which will give so much hope, so much comfort, so much confidence to our allies who are in the travails of war as prompt and united and whole-hearted action in the passage of this measure. It will convey to them the unmistakeable assurance and guaranty that the United States has embarked on this matter in earnest; that there is to be no halting, no back stepping; that all our strength and all our resources, at whatever cost of money or sacrifice of life and human comfort, are to be thrown in the scale with them in the great fight that they are making across the water in behalf of liberty, in behalf of humanity, in behalf of that vital principle out of which the American union sprang, the principle of representative government."

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During the course of his speech Senator Simmons became most eloquent in pleading for help for our allies. He urged:

"Let us do this heartily, cordially, unanimously, and without hesitation; let us do it in the spirit of men who thoroughly understand and comprehend the great cause in which we are fighting, the great thing that we are undertaking, and who are entering into it without thought of profit, without thought of financial loss, without thought of the bodily dis-



comfort, without thought of the sacrifice, but ready and willing to make every sacrifice, even of our lives and our fortunes, in defense of our outraged rights in the cause of democracy and humanity throughout the broad expanse of the earth."<sup>23</sup>

As a result of Senator Simmons' stirring appeal, the bill was passed. Of the \$ 7,000,000,000 appropriated by Congress, \$ 3,000,000,000 went for loans to foreign governments. Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and Rumania each came in for a share. The loans were not advanced in gold, but in credits in American banks with which our associates in the war purchased supplies in America.<sup>24</sup>

During the course of the war five huge loans, amounting in all to \$ 21, 448, 120, 300, were permitted by the Senate partly through the strenuous efforts of Senator Simmons. In 1919 when Senator Simmons was pushing through the Senate a bill for the last big bond issue, he referred in the following terms to the crucial stage which the country had just come through:

"If there ever was a time and condition calculated to induce the people to disregard every consideration of profit, to invest their money upon the purely naked basis of patriotic duty, I think Senators will agree with me that that was the condition which existed when we made the last sale of liberty

23. C. R., 65-1, p. 747.

34. Latane, American Foreign Policy, pp. 594-595.





bonds. I think Senators will agree with me further that if it had not been for those conditions, for the fact that in Europe 2,000,000 of our boys were under arms, face to face with the enemy, with the issue hanging in the balance, and with the chances, perhaps rather against our country, the sales of liberty bonds would have fallen short...." <sup>25</sup>

Senator Simmons also supported the measure for selective draft and concurred in all of the other plans of the administration for winning the war. <sup>26</sup>

### THE PEACE TREATY AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS

In 1919 when the Versailles treaty was drawn up with the view of formally ending the World War, there was written into this treaty a section providing for a League of Nations. This, as we all know, was an idea of President Wilson's. He desired to establish permanent peace, and he insisted that all the nations should finally be included in the League.

Numerous duties were imposed on the League, and its

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25. C. R., 65-3, p. 4720.

26. Ashe- etc., Biographical History of North Carolina, p. 487.



members had to make important pledges in the interest of peace. Article X, which proved to be a large bone of contention in the United States Senate, bound the nations belonging to the League to respect and guarantee the territory and political independence of each associated nation. The covenant further required that when the members could not settle any dispute by diplomatic negotiation, they would submit it to the League Council for review and on no account would go to war over it until three months after the Council had made its report on the quarrel. In case the decision was unanimous, the members affected by it were to abide by its terms. If, however, any member refused to stand by its pledges, then its conduct was to be regarded as an act of war against the League and to be dealt with either by cutting off its trade or taking some other measure of compulsion.

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When the treaty was presented to the United States Senate for approval, it was greeted by a decided opposition. Sentiment for and against the treaty ran mainly along party lines. One group, known as the "reservationists," favored ratification with certain conditions respecting American rights; while the second group, known as "irreconcilables," opposed the ratification of the treaty in any form. Between these two groups was a large group of Republicans and Democrats who desired the ratification of the treaty provided





certain interpretations and reservations were added, chiefly for the purpose of defining more clearly the obligations of the United States under the League Covenant.<sup>28</sup>

The grounds of the Republican opposition lay partly in the terms of peace imposed on Germany and partly in the Covenant of the League of Nations, but most of the criticism was directed against the League itself. Article X guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of the members of the League was as already noted subject to a specially heavy fire. As an outcome of their deliberations, the Republicans drafted a long list of reservations which changed many of the vital parts of the treaty. President Wilson refused to accept them because he felt that they nullified the whole program for permanent peace. No compromise could be reached, so in the end the Senate rejected the treaty of Versailles, and the United States failed to enter the League of Nations.<sup>29</sup>

Senator Simmons took a rather outstanding part in the discussions centering on the peace treaty and the League of Nations. Just as he had stood with President Wilson in all of his war measures, so he now gave him his undivided support in his peace efforts. At first he favored the treaty and the League Covenant just as they were presented to the Senate by President Wilson, but after studying the situation

28. Latane, American Foreign Policy, p. 630.

29. Ibid., pp. 630-636.



in the Senate, he realized that some concessions in the way of reservations would have to be made in order to secure ratification. He then prepared a compromise with high hopes of bringing together those who favored the treaty and covenant without reservation and those who were in favor of it with reservations.

On September 8, 1919 he made a personal explanation before the Senate as to his stand on the subject.

"I am in favor of and would gladly vote for the treaty and the League Covenant as it was originally presented to the Senate by the President, without amendment or reservation. I agree with the President's interpretation of the controverted provisions of that document, and I do not believe it contains anything which would jeopardize American interests. I also believe it is of the highest importance to this country and the world that it should be ratified without further delay.

"However, after a thorough study of the situation in the Senate, I am convinced that some concessions in the way of reservations will have to be made to secure its ratification, and, so believing, I have recently discussed with a number of my colleagues the advisability of reaching some compromise between those who favor the treaty without reservation and those who are in favor of it with conservative reservations of an interpretative character.

"I am utterly opposed, however, to the reservations proposed by the Foreign Relations Committee. Some of these reservations are, in substance and essence amendments which





would radically change the scope and character of the instrument, emasculating some of the main provisions of the league, and which would call for reconsideration by the peace conference." <sup>30</sup>

Senator Simmons was very much opposed to the fourteen reservations submitted by Senator Lodge in behalf of the Foreign Relations Committee. He felt that they defeated the very purpose of the President's peace plans. When the votes were taken for the various reservations of Senator Lodge he voted against each of them. However, in spite of his efforts, they <sup>31</sup> were accepted by the Senate.

On March 15, 1920 when the Senate, sitting as a Committee of the Whole and in open executive session, resumed consideration of the treaty, Senator Simmons offered the following amendment as a substitute for Article X.

"The United States agrees to use its friendly offices, when requested so to do under the provisions of Article 10, in assisting to procure a just and peaceful settlement of territorial or political controversies between nations, or to protect any member of the league from external aggression; but does not assume any obligation to use its military or naval forces, or its financial or economic resources for the purpose of intervention in the controversies or conflicts between

30. C. R., 66-1, p.5015.

31. C. R., 66-1, p. 8563.



nations, or to protect the territorial integrity or political independence of any nation under the provisions of Article 10, unless in any particular case the Congress in the exercise of full liberty of action and in the light of full information as to the national justice and human rights involved, shall by act or joint resolution so provide. Nothing herein shall be deemed to impair the obligations of the United States under Article 16."

32

After presenting his amendment, Senator Simmons entered again into a discussion of the peace treaty, and during the course of his speech, showed wherein his amendment met the objections that were raised against the provisions of Article X.

" You....have said that this article of the treaty leaves unguarded the interests of the United States. Your main and fundamental objection to it was that we would have to send our boys to fight the battles of the world. Under this proposed reservation this particular obligation is eliminated.

"Then you said there were other controversies in addition to this that must grow out of the question of preserving the territorial integrity and political independence, which you wished protected. You did not wish the United States to intercede by the use of its Army, by the use of the boycott, by the use of its financial resources, by the use of its ec-





onomic resources. You did not wish it to interfere with any sort of controversy between other nations. The reservations which I have offered here meets that objection, and says that just as in other cases, of questions of territorial and political independence or any other sort of case and situation that may arise in connection with the quarrels and disputes of other countries, that the United States assumes no obligation in that case, as well as in the case of territorial questions, no obligation to use its army, navy, or other instrumentalities of force and coercion.

"The Lodge reservation does not permit our interference in controversies between other nations under any circumstances whatever without consent of Congress. My reservation provides that we shall not use army or navy or economic resources to interfere with those controversies without consent of Congress. The Lodge reservation excludes all kinds of interference, while mine excludes the use of certain agencies except with consent of Congress."<sup>33</sup>

When the substitute, which Senator Simmons offered, was put to a vote it was rejected. He then submitted it a second time and it was again turned down.<sup>34</sup>

On March 18, he continued the discussion, and in referring to the Lodge reservation said:

33. C. R., 66-2, pp. 4326-4327.

34..C. R., 66-2, p. 4329.



"I can not, as I now see it, vote for that resolution if the substitute of the Senator from Massachusetts remains unchanged, because I think the substitute of the Senator is nothing more than that we shall not interfere in any controversy whatever in any way whatsoever, even by the exercise of our good offices, unless the Congress shall first so provide. I think that is going a little too far.

"I will make many concessions in order to get myself in a position where I can vote for the ratification of the treaty. I think it would be a crime against civilization and against humanity not to ratify it, and I would vote for it if there were any chance for me to do so consistently with my judgment and conscience.

"I appeal to the friends of the treaty upon the other side to forcibly break loose from this "body of death" and meet us halfway and let us join hands, and shoulder to shoulder, let us do this great work for humanity." <sup>35</sup>

During the discussion Senator Lenroot asked Senator Simmons if there would not be votes enough on the other side of the Chamber to ratify the treaty if President Wilson would permit it. To this question Senator Simmons replied:

"No; I do not think this side of the Chamber allows President Wilson to control its conscience. I do not think it allows President Wilson to control its action as much as the





Senators on the other side who are in favor of the treaty allow those who are opposed to it <sup>to</sup> control their consciences and their votes.

"Twice we could have compromised this matter, in my judgment, and twice the friends of the treaty on the other side of the Chamber were ready to get together with the friends on this side of the Chamber, when, by reason of an iron-bound agreement of some sort, which they solemnly entered into at the very inception of this controversy, they found themselves in such position that they could not vote their own convictions unless they got the consent of Senators who disagreed with them fundamentally and in every particular.

"It is a case, as has been repeatedly stated in the newspapers of the country and as is known to every Senator here, where more than two-thirds of this body are eager and anxious to ratify the treaty, assuming that those who claim to be mild reservationists on the other side are earnest and sincere, and I do not question that. More than two-thirds of this body stand here ready and anxious to ratify the treaty, and yet the majority on the other side of the Chamber are gagged and bound hand and foot by a contract that they made with Senators whose whole purpose and object is to kill the treaty." <sup>36</sup>

When the Senate failed in its efforts to get the treaty and the League Covenant ratified with all the reservations



and understandings attached, it passed a joint resolution on May 15 terminating the state of war declared to exist on April 6, 1917 between the German Government and the United States. Senator Simmons, evidently feeling that this was too much of a reflection on the honor of the United States, voted against it.<sup>37</sup> The resolution, however, passed the Senate and was sent to the President who promptly vetoed it.

Thus the treaty was left hanging in the air, and a technical state of war with Germany continued until July 2, 1921, when Congress approved another joint resolution declaring the war at an end. On August 25, the United States Government, through a commissioner, signed a separate peace treaty with Germany and about the same time similar treaties were made with Austria and Hungary.<sup>38</sup> Senator Simmons voted against each treaty, but all three were agreed to by Congress.<sup>39</sup>

To Senator Simmons it appeared that the opposition to the treaty and the League in the Senate was based upon most unworthy motives; a desire to discredit a political opponent and a determination to humiliate President Wilson whom many of the Senators personally disliked. By defeating the treaty, they were able to accomplish their purpose. He realized that much that was said and done in the course of the debate was

37. C. R., 66-2, p. 7102.

38. Latane, American Foreign Policy, pp. 640-641.

39. C. R., 67-1, pp. 6438-6439.





not altogether influenced by objections to the League idea but rather by considerations of the effects that Congressional action on the treaty would have upon the approaching presidential contest.

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## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As we look back over the career of Senator Simmons, we note that he had little to say in regard to some of the foreign policies of the United States, while on others he expressed himself very strongly and took an outstanding part even to the point of unexpectedly altering the course of his Democratic colleagues.

Senator Simmons, as I have mentioned before, entered the Senate just at the time when it was being confronted with the question of imperialism. Immediately, he launched into the discussions, and fought with all his might for the independence of the Philippines. He held that the Filipinos should be allowed to work out their own destiny just as this country did after the Revolutionary War. He admitted that they would not, of course, be able to establish a form of government which would conform to our ideals of democracy but he insisted that independence would be a step along the way. He felt that our





Government should relinquish possession of the islands and withdraw from the archipelago just as soon as it could do so consistently with honor and our national obligations to those people, and that such action not only contribute to the welfare of the Filipinos but also to the interests of the United States.

When in 1916 there was talk of giving the Philippines their independence and leaving them flat, Senator Simmons strenuously objected, on the ground that it would be a rather hard measure for us to take those people who had never had an opportunity to establish a government or provide for defense, and after having held them for eighteen years suddenly to turn them loose so as to be the prey of grasping nations. Instead, he felt that just as soon as it was wise we should retire from the islands, but before leaving should provide for some international system of guaranteeing the sovereignty of those people.

As to Hawaii and Porto Rico, Senator Simmons showed little interest. In fact, these issues in most respects were already settled before he entered the Senate.

When the Cuban question came before the Senate, he took a different attitude from that which he had shown regarding the Philippines, but he explained this inconsistency by stating that the situations were different, and thus required different treatment. He favored the reciprocity treaty with Cuba, although it was a Republican measure against which his



Democratic colleagues were very much opposed, but he favored it because he felt that it would benefit the people of the United States as a whole. By his eloquence and conciliating powers, he finally helped to persuade the Senate to agree to the treaty.

As to the Isle of Pines question, he felt that there was not any room for contention since it was plainly evident that this island belonged to Cuba. He, therefore, voted in favor of the treaty recognizing the sovereignty of Cuba over the Isle of Pines.

Concerning our relations with Panama, Senator Simmons had very definite ideas. He at all times was a strong advocate for the Canal, but not once did he ever condone the incident surrounding the acquisition of it. While he criticized the Administration for its hasty action in the Panamanian revolution, he at the same time favored the ratification of the treaty with Panama saying that it was only making the best of an accomplished fact. Although he had no sympathy with Colombia, he nevertheless thought she had suffered wrong at our hands and that some proper way should be found to compensate her for the loss of her territory.

During the Panama tolls controversy, as we remember, Senator Simmons got himself into an embarrassing position by the inconsistent action which he took. In 1912 he strongly advocated the passage of the tolls exemption bill, stating that when there was a doubt as to whether we had the right,





that doubt should be resolved in favor of the American Government and American interests. Just as in the Cuban reciprocity bill, this was a Republican measure and it was only through the power of Senator Simmons' position and arguments that it passed. Two years later when President Wilson insisted that the measure be repealed, Senator Simmons faced about and worked just as strenuously for its repeal. There was determined opposition in the Senate to this proposal of the President's, but Senator Simmons overcome the antagonism. Almost single-handed he turned the Senate to a reluctant support of the measure. His amendment, proposed in the debate, was the vehicle that carried it through. There were two reasons for Senator Simmons reversing his position on the controversy: first, the fact that President Wilson urged repeal, and, secondly, because from 1910 to 1914 so much light had been shed upon the question that he had come to realize that the exemption bill was really violating our treaty pledge with Great Britain.

As to the merits of the controversy, there was no unanimity of opinion on either side of the Atlantic. Some British authorities entirely justified the American position, while some American authorities took the British position. Much could be said on either side and Senator Simmons in my estimation is to be commended for the ability which he showed in meeting such a difficult situation.

Concerning our relations with Mexico, Senator Simmons firmly adhered to President Wilson's general policy of "watch-



ful waiting" but on the two occasions when the system broke down, he voted in favor of intervention. However, he was not alarmed at the Mexican situation, and urged the Senate to go slowly in its legislation in preparation for war. He felt that our Government could settle the controversy and retire without having to go to war. Here again he acted the role of a pacificator.

Political conditions in Nicaragua were very unstable during the time that Senator Simmons was in the Senate. Frequently revolutionary outbreaks occurred. It was inevitable that sooner or later the United States would be called upon to protect the threatened interests of the nationals and in 1912 President Diaz requested our Government to send American forces to Nicaragua to protect the rights of American citizens. Off and on until 1929 the troops were stationed there. Senator Simmons voted in favor of sending the troops but he regretted very much the unfortunate adventure into Nicaragua, for it apparently accomplished no permanent good and brought down upon the United States Government much adverse criticism.

We have noted before that Senator Simmons was one of the strongest advocates for Cuban reciprocity but when President Taft advocated a reciprocal agreement with Canada, he denounced it in no uncertain terms. Here again, according to his explanation, the situation was simply different.

In the Cuban reciprocity he saw the possibility of the United States as a whole being benefited while in Canadian reciprocity only the protected manufacturers of the East would





get the advantage of the reduced Canadian tariffs. He explained that he objected to this treaty because it lowered the prices of the products which the farmer had to sell while at the same time it caused the prices to rise on the products which he had to buy.

During the World War, the United States Government purchased and built a large fleet of merchant ships to facilitate the transporting of troops and goods to Europe and with the close of the war, the Shipping Board attempted to keep these ships in operation, but the decline in the demand for shipping facilities made their maintenance unprofitable. So the Merchant Marine Act was passed to provide for the sale of those government-owned ships to American citizens. Senator Simmons strenuously objected to this idea. For seven or eight years he had advocated the building of a merchant marine but never for once dreamed that such an excellent opportunity for its establishment would come within his day and time. To him it was simply the height of foolishness to let such an opportunity slip. He was thoroughly convinced that sometime during this generation the government would be forced to establish an adequate merchant marine, and now was the time for it while we had all those war ships on our hands. However, in spite of all the arguing and pleading that Senator Simmons could do the ships were sold, and Congress refused to subsidize any of the merchant vessels owned by Americans.

Not until the beginning of 1900 did this country show



much opposition to the hordes of immigrants that were pouring in each year. Senator Simmons was deeply interested in the immigration question and not until the so called new immigration began to exceed very greatly the old type that he began to feel that there was a real menace to the country from the influx of immigrants that were pouring into this country in increasing numbers from southern and eastern Europe. When in 1912 the Senate was considering a bill to restrict immigration, Senator Simmons offered an amendment to the bill to impose an educational test. Not until 1917 was his proposal adopted and then it was passed over the President's veto.

It was the outbreak of the World War in 1914 that brought the first important check to the flow of immigration into this country but just as soon as peace was declared the flow started again at almost its pre-war volume. The country became alarmed that there arose a demand to stop immigration entirely. Senator Simmons felt that there was no real danger of any great influx of undesirable aliens for the next few years because of the deterring economic conditions of this country and the action of the Italian Government in suspending immigration. He stated that the South, while opposed to the class of undesirable immigrants, was very very anxious to get good farmers. Due to the boll weevil and the migration of many of the negroes to the North, the South was badly in need of more labor. He did think, however, that the circumstances





called for a rigid, strict policy of selection. Such a policy would solve the difficulty. He was very much opposed to the government passing any legislation that did not adjust itself to the real situation and remedy the evil.

When this country reached the momentous decision of entering the war, the President and Congress were confronted by a gigantic task in preparing the nation for the part which it was to play in the great enterprise. In all of the war measures which President Wilson was forced to pass, Senator Simmons concurred, and to him was assigned the tremendous task of putting through Congress the legislative measures for the floating of huge loans to finance the war and the allies.

When the war was over and President Wilson's peace plans were submitted to the United States Senate, Senator Simmons threw all the strength of his position and arguments into an effort to save the treaty in its original form, but when he saw that it was absolutely necessary to make reservations, he attempted to bring about a compromise. We all know how the Senate finally defeated the treaty, thus bringing down humiliation upon President Wilson and disappointing all the nations with which we had been associated in the war. Senator Simmons regretted very deeply the whole affair not only because he was a strong admirer of President Wilson and disliked seeing him treated so, but also because he wished to see realized those ideals of peace and justice for which the League idea stood.



It can be rightly said that throughout his political career, Senator Simmons had at heart the interest of the American people as a whole, and not once did he vary from this policy. His honesty, force of will, and administrative soundness were felt throughout the country. As regards the foreign policies, his role generally was that of a compromiser. In this respect, he reminds me of Henry Clay, the "Great Pacificator".

Comparatively speaking, there were good men in the Senate more prominent in foreign affairs than Senator Simmons. While he maintained, as I have already mentioned at the beginning of this study, a decided interest in some of the foreign issues, the prime interest of his career was in domestic issues of an economic nature.

Fortunate is the public if it is able to discover in sufficient numbers leaders of such high capacity, sterling worth, and spotless integrity as Senator Simmons possessed.





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









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